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    Realism theory provides the most powerful explanation for the state of war and the rise 
and fall of great powers. It expounds the important concepts and themes like national 
sovereignty, security, survival, interests, balance of power, balance of terror, alliance, 
dominance, hegemony and polarity. Realism can be classified as classical realism, structural 
realism and neoclassical realism. In recent years, liberalism, globalism and constructivism also 
have greatly influenced academics and policy-makers under the new phenomena of 
globalization and terrorism. 
     This paper explores how classical realism theory has been applied to and revealed in the 
issue of American policy towards China. The past years of U.S. relations with China have been 
marked by many wars and diplomatic issues that bear important messages for contemporary 
policy-makers. Based upon the most representative incidents in the chronicles, this paper 
categorizes American relations with China into three periods: period one, from commercialism 
in 1784 to imperialism in 1899; period two, from dominance in 1900 to confrontation in 1949; 
Period three, from enemies in 1950 to competitors in 2009. From a brief retrospective of major 
events that occurred, it is concluded that most incidents are related to national interest and 
power issues, while only several cases are about ideological disputes. 
     The emergence of China as an economic power within the last few years will shape the 
world as much as the United States in the late 19th century. As America is the world’s greatest 
power and China is the world’s greatest emerging power, the relationship between these two 
iv 
countries will largely determine the history of the twenty-first century. History teaches that 
such power transitions are inherently fraught with dangers and opportunities. Thus, it would 
serve the interests of the United States to rethink its relationship with China and make its 
policies more global and focused on the long term. No matter what happens in China, 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
      When I took classes of international relations theories and international relations history, 
I was always deeply impressed and intrigued with the insightful and impregnable analysis and 
arguments of classical realism about human nature, self-interest, survival motivation, self-help 
anarchy, national interest, power struggle and balance of power. Plus, I was also very interested 
in the intercourse and exchange between the United States and China, in which there were so 
many fascinating stories and episodes. These events include the early American commercial 
adventures in the remote Chinese Empire; the first treaty between the two countries after 
China’s defeat by Britain in the Opium War; the “Open Door” policy to the Big Powers when 
America became dominant in the Far East; the sympathy and neutrality when China was 
afflicted by Japanese encroachment; the mediation and hesitation during the upheavals of 
Chinese Civil War and communist came to power; the animosity between America and China 
after the Korean War; the “ice breaking” of the visit by Kissinger and Nixon to Beijing; the 
tragedy in Tiananmen Square and the issue of human rights; the missile tests and the crisis over 
the Taiwan Strait; and the emergence of China as a global power.      
       I was inspired by the idea that I can apply a realist interpretation to U.S. relations with 
China. Specifically, I was intrigued by how U.S. relations with China can explain and justify 
the arguments and principles of classical realism theory and how the practices and realities of 
American foreign policy towards China test and vindicate the credo formulated by the ageless 
wisdom of classical realism. History serves as a rich data base for constructing theories about 
how the world operates. Past U.S. relations with China can also reflect and reveal how America 
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and China acted and reacted, by what principles the American policy-makers were motivated 
intrinsically and how American foreign policies were interpreted properly.  
      This paper focuses on the key concepts of national interest and power (national strength) 
of classical realism theory. From U.S. relations with China, this paper mainly analyzes from the 
American perspective. For the majority of the past two hundred and twenty five years of 
U.S.-China relations, America has been in a superior position that enabled it to enjoy more 
power and influence. American foreign policies were therefore more offensive; in contrast, 
China was relatively weak in power and defensive in policy.  
      When I emphasize the vindication of classical realism theory, I don’t deny the noble and 
moral theme of liberalism theory and its claim on the function and impact of law and institution. 
Yet morality itself is a kind of representation of power and morality sometimes is swallowed up 
by self-interest as rivers are lost in the sea. I agree with globalism on the issues of market, 
colony and imperial scrambles for their own gains. However, globalism is limited by time and 
scope in international relations research as a whole. Similarly, social constructivism serves as a 
very good approach to analyze interest and identity. However, constructivism is primarily a 
kind of methodology, less useful for the exploration of international relations. The reason I 
choose classical realism as the interpretation of U.S. relations with China is that I believe 
national interest and power represent the ultimate motivations and goals of American foreign 
policy towards China. 
This thesis covers the extensive and broad historical sweep of U.S. relations with China 
and does not focus on one issue or one period in order to avoid viewing events in       
isolation or losing the overall context and background. This discussion and conclusion from the 
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brief description and narrative of the history of U.S.-China relations doesn’t intend to discover 
and sum up the entire foreign policy-making processes of every American administration; it is 
based on inductive reasoning drawn from the major U.S.-China incidents and bilateral foreign 
policies to explain and validate the explanatory insight and persuasiveness of classical realism 
theory.    
     Very few works apply international relations theories to American foreign policy towards 
China and the numerous books that do address U.S.-China relations rarely correlate them to 
international relations theories. This analysis will combine international relations theories, 
especially classical realism theory, with American foreign policies towards China to 
demonstrate how classical realism theory stands out whenever the spectrum of U.S. relations 
with China vacillates from trade priority. “Jackal diplomacy”, “Open Door” policy, sympathy 
and neutrality, hostility, to conciliatory and adversarial perspectives are some of the 
characteristics of American policies towards China. Hopefully this work will demonstrate to 
the reader the mutually paramount role of national interest in U.S. relations with China. 
National Interest 
      This paper is an interpretation of the realistic perspective about U.S. relations with China. 
The central concepts of classical realism theory are national interest and power. National 
interest is like the common currency of international relations and has to be universally 
applicable to all states, whatever their form of social organization. If national interests were to 
vary among nations, then they would no longer speak the same language about these interests.      
National interest is the most comprehensive description of the complex study of foreign 
policy. It is a very attractive and intellectually sturdy term yet, in practice, it is also an 
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exceptionally unclear concept and proves difficult to define. We can simplify and modify the 
concept by breaking it up into elements and components until it becomes manageable. The 
imprecision and ambiguity of the concept of national interest suffers from too many meanings 
instead of no meaning. It assumes a variety of meanings in the various contexts in which it is 
used.  
  National interest usually refers to foreign policy, but it is also applied to domestic 
politics. When referring to the domestic sphere, we often employ alternative terms, such as 
“public” or “general” interest, etc. National interest consists of two parts—national and interest. 
National refers both to the nation as a social group and to the state as a political organization. 
According to Joseph Frankel, as a social group, “the definition of national interest further 
depends upon the position a person takes up between several pairs of extremes, such as 
altruistic-egoistic (ideals v. self-interest, idealists v. realists), short-and long-term concerns, 
activist-reactive, radical-conservative, hard-and tender-minded, traditional-innovating, 
collectivist- individualists, etc.” (1) And as a political organization, a nation has no feelings but 
only interests. David Clinton argues that “nations as well as individuals, act for their own 
benefit, and not for the benefit of others, unless both interests happen to be assimilated.” (2)  
Interest is an organizing concept and the governing principle for the understanding of 
international relations. It can be retrieved to the early civilizations, it is deeply rooted in the 
human society, and it dominates all human activities. The doctrine of the national interest 
draws on a particular view of human nature and emphasizes man’s radical and ever-present 
drive or lust for self-interest. Joseph Frankel categorizes national interest into vital interest, the 
spatial dimension of national interest, and the time dimension of national interest. He argues 
5 
the vital interest is “that the state is unwilling to make concessions on it and that it prepared, if 
necessary, to go to war over it.” (3) The adjective “vital” has an emotional appeal and, as it lacks 
clear legal or political definition, it is open to abuse in political argument. The spatial 
dimension of national interest means the territory, which is of paramount importance since it 
guarantees in legal theory that the state enjoys complete sovereign authority and no other state 
is entitled to trespass across them. As in U.S. relations with China, the issue of Taiwan remains 
a flash point, for both countries agree Taiwan is part of China. Yet America has a Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA), with commitments to provide safety for Taiwan’s political, economic 
system and life style. The time dimension of national interest is involved in dealing with 
current problems, or with plans for the future, or with the evaluation of the past. 
  Charles A. Beard gives the overall scope about the contents of national interest in his 
book The Idea of National Interest. (4) From his review over the pivots of American diplomacy 
since her independence, he lists the Constitution as a conception of national interest, national 
interest in territorial expansion, national interest in commercial expansion, foreign implications 
of domestic affairs, moral obligations in national interest, interpretation, advancement, and 
enforcement of national interest. National interest is classified by Joseph Frankel into four 
categories: aspirational national interest, operational national interest, explanatory national 
interest and polemical national interest. (5) W. David Clinton concludes four charges of 
national interest in his book The Two Faces of National Interest: the undemocratic national 
interest, the irrational national interest, the obsolescent national interest, and exclusive national 
interest. (6)  
Charles A. Beard agrees national interest includes moral obligations, so political 
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affiliation, value orientation, ideology and institution all have inherent impact to the 
identification of national interest. Though some vital parts of interest and the methods to secure 
are impervious to ideological and institutional changes, the permanence of national interest is 
sometimes relative, and subject to reinterpretation, especially in the light of changing world 
politics. Nevertheless, these ambiguities in defining the national interest do not necessarily 
invalidate national interest as the central concept, just as the alleged vagueness of natural law 
does not refute its existence. (7)   
The concept of national interest can perform three basic functions. First, national 
interest can guide people’s attention to foreign policy. The invocation of national interest won’t 
necessarily result in unanimity regarding the proper diplomatic, military, and other steps a 
government should take abroad. Second, national interest can provide a justification for 
leadership. Third, national interest can serve as a tool in the formulation, execution and 
analysis of foreign policy.   
Power 
       As Morgenthau argues, “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way 
through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of 
power.” (8) Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man 
over man, nation over nation, and it covers all social relations which serve that end, from 
physical forms to psychological ties. As political policies in domestics, foreign policies in 
world affairs seeks either to keep power, which is a policy of the status quo; to increase power, 
prone to be imperialism; or to demonstrate power, a policy of prestige.   
The inevitability and centrality of power politics comes also from human nature, as 
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Morgenthau points out, “there is no social action which would not contain at least a trace of this 
desire to make one’s own person prevail against others. It is this ubiquity of the desire for 
power which, besides and beyond any particular selfishness or other evilness of purpose, 
constitutes the ubiquity of evil in human action” (9)  
  When in daily conversation or academic convention, we refer to states as big powers or 
small powers, which demonstrate the importance of the possession of power. Some states have 
great power and others have much less, there will always be the danger that the difference in 
power opens the possibility for profitable aggression. The distribution of different powers 
largely determines the pattern and structure of international relations, and the relations between 
states have long been called “power politics”, for power and use of force has never been 
excluded.  
 If power politics is regarded as a game, the power itself is solely a scoring device. The 
great wealth, great population, great strength and large territory all relatively increase the 
overall power of a nation. When talking about why some nations are strong and others weak, 
Harold & Margaret Sprout mention some criteria, among which the first is the standing 
armaments that each nation maintains ready for action in time of peace. In some cases, the 
peace time military forces give a fair indication of a nation’s total strength and its relative 
position. Related with military power and war, what count heavily are the countries with large 
area and consequent depth for retreat if necessary, for the space of territory can also turn into 
military power.  
 Population is always a logical starting point when making an overall estimate of the 
position for a nation in the world. Without people there would be no power or politics. The 
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number of the people, the age, health, education and other qualities do affect a country’s 
position. Yet population itself does not spell power; for example, China had over four hundred 
million people from 1840 to 1945, yet China was very weak.  
Economic resources are important. Without food, people starve; without raw materials, 
people cannot build or produce. Furthermore, tools, skills, organization and technology are 
required to transmute the essential materials into political power and influence. Economic 
development is a factor of greater importance. Advanced and efficient methods of production, 
adequate and smoothly transportation system, scientific research and development all play 
vital roles in determining a country’s status in the world.  
Harold & Margaret Sprout also emphasize the roles of soft power. “Organization 
consists of regulations and other means for securing cooperative disciplined work toward a 
desired end” (10) Moral qualities, moral stamina of the people, their unity, discipline, 
confidence in government, and ideology are of equal importance to the national strength as the 
physical forms. When nations are in pursuit of power, the factor of ideologies necessarily 
involves the contest for power psychologically and morally, which is acceptable, although the 
use of ideologies is always regarded as a disguise of one’s immediate goal. The immediate goal 
is power, and national power is power over the minds and actions of other nations.   
According to E. H. Carr, politics is always power politics, and power is always an 
essential element of politics. Failure to recognize this will vitiate all attempts to establish 
international forms of government, and confuse nearly every attempt to discuss the subject. 
“Political power in the international sphere may be divided, for purposes of discussion, into 
three categories: (a) military power, (b) economic power, (c) power over opinion.” (11) Since 
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war and the possibility of war is always a dominant factor in international relations, military 
strength becomes a recognized standard of political values, not only as an instrument, but also 
sometimes as an end in itself. Economic power is, in fact, political power, either in the form of 
export of capital or in the form of control of foreign markets. As for the third form of power, 
power over opinion is a modern weapon for the masses like propaganda. In Carr’s point of view, 
the victory of World War I was achieved by a skillful combination of military power, economic 
power, and power over opinion. Since opinion is conditioned by status and interest, the 
dominant powers can manipulate opinions favorable to their advantage and also can easily 
impose opinions on others.  
Ray S. Cline’s World Power Assessment: a Calculus of Strategic Drift presents us a 
helpful formula of basic conceptual framework for measuring national power: (12)  
Pp=(C+E+M) * (S+W)   
      Where:  
          Pp=perceived power 
          C=critical mass=population + territory 
          E=economic capability 
          M=military capability 
          S=strategic purpose 
          W=will to pursue national strategy. 
 The fundamental flaw of Cline’s power formula is that he adds the quantifiable things but 
multiply them by judgmental things, thus heavily showing the outcome. There are too many 
variables and human intangibles in measuring the power of a nation. The estimation of national 
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power is not a science, so we cannot expect a nation’s strength and political influence to be 
measured with mathematical exactness. Classical realism assumes that power is an objective 
category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is 
fixed once and for all. In foreign policy, American  government has always enthusiastically 
explored, justified, and applied other instruments of power: alliances, economic and military 
aid, bases abroad, weapons development, covert action, intervention, propaganda campaigns 
and so on. (13)  
                  Balance of Power 
       Balance of power is viewed as a “universal concept” by Hans Morgenthau, who 
believes “balance” and “equilibrium” are synonyms, and equilibrium is common in many 
sciences, like physics, biology, economics, sociology, and political science. The equilibrium 
within a system relies on a number of autonomous forces, and it is influenced by outside forces 
or disturbed by forces inside the system. Its stability or reestablishment depends on the degrees 
that the forces change. In international relations, each nation aspires to obtain power either by 
maintaining the status quo or overthrowing it, which leads inevitability to a configuration that 
is called the balance of power and the policies that aim at preserving or altering it.  
  The nature of multiplicity in international relations and the antagonism among the 
individual nations determine the international conflicts, and the distribution of power decides 
the patterns of the balance of power—direct opposition between two big powers or blocs, and 
competitions among several actors. Thus the structure of the balance of power is divided into 
dominant system and dependent system. According to Hans Morgenthau, there are different 
methods of the balance of power. First, divide and rule, when a nation tries to make or keep its 
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competitors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided. Secondly, compensations, mainly 
implying territorial acquisitions. Thirdly, armaments, which means a nation tries to keep up 
with, and then to outdo the military forces of the competitors. The last is alliances, a matter of 
expediency other than principle.        
  Balance of power is usually used “with four different meanings: first, as a policy aimed 
at a certain state of affairs; secondly, as an actual state of affairs; the third, as an approximately 
equal distribution of power; the last as any distribution of power.” (14) Most of the time, 
balance of power refers to an actual state of affairs in which power is distributed among several 









Research questions in this paper mainly cover international relations theories, especially 
realism and classical realism. Since this thesis focuses on the realist interpretation of U.S. 
relations with China, liberalism, globalism and constructivism are not introduced in detail. Key 
questions consider how classical realism theory informs and explains U.S relations with China; 
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what are the implications of the history of American foreign policy towards China; why 
classical realism can be best explained and justified from the ups and downs of U.S.-China 
relations; and how national interest and power issues play a vital role in formulation and 
execution of American foreign policy making. These research questions are thus framed into 
the following patterns:  
H1:  Classical realism theory is the most effective of international relations theories, and 
can best explain U.S. relations with China.  
    H2:  National interest is the central concept in realist international relations theories, and it 
is also the central doctrine for American foreign policy-makers when dealing with China. 
H3:  National strength and balance of power best explain classical realism theory, and 
power relations are central to U.S. relations with China. 
H4:  Soft power, such as ideology, value system and human rights are parts of national 
interest, yet they are always secondary compared to core interests like territory, commerce and 
the military in U.S. relations with China.          
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the preparation process, this paper focused on books and references from four 
aspects: international relations theory, American diplomatic history, U.S. relations with China, 
and American power and American national interest. The first aspect includes National interest 
by Joseph Frankel, The Two Faces of National Interest by W. David Clinton, National Interest, 
Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy edited by W. David Clinton and Kenneth W. Thompson, 
Foundations of National Power edited by Harold & Margaret Sprout, Politics among Nations, 
the Struggle for Power and Peace by Hans J. Morgenthau, Contending Theories of 
International Relations by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. 
 The second aspect concerning American diplomatic history includes The Idea of 
National Interest, an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy by Charles A. Beard. The 
third aspect includes: America’s Response to China, a History of Sino-American Relations by 
Warren I. Cohen, The United States and China by Arnold Xiangze Jiang, The United States 
Odyssey in China, 1784-1990 by Charles R. Kitts, Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 
1784 edited by Thomas H. Etzold, Sino-American Relations 1945-1955 edited by Harry 
Harding and Yuan Ming, Nixon and Mao by Margaret MacMillan, China Cross Talk edited by 
Scott Kennedy. The last aspect includes two books: The Practice of Power, U.S. Relations with 
China since 1949 by Rosemary Foot, and American National Interest, Virtue and Power in 
Foreign Policy by Karl Von Vorys. 
1.  Whether politics is an exact science or not remains one of the debated questions in 
political science, and some political concept like “national interest” fills in our daily speech, 
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yet by the very passion it raises, it can often obscure a proper understanding of the sense in 
which it is, or should be. Analysis and reassessment of national interest is the theme of the book 
National interest by Joseph Frankel of University of Southampton in 1970. This publication is 
one of the series of short books, discussing the key concepts in political science, for the benefits 
of academics and the reading public.  
      According to the author, “national interest is a singular vague concept. It assumes a 
variety of meanings in the various contexts in which it is used and, despite its fundamental 
importance, these meanings often cannot be reconciled; hence no agreement can be reached 
about its ultimate meaning.” (15) Yet the author analyses this concept from the history of its 
usage, the purpose of foreign policy, from foreign-domestic distinctions, the basic components, 
the spatial and time dimensions, the formulation of process and agencies, the ideas of images, 
motivations and values.  
      Joseph Frankel holds that national interest is unlikely to disappear as a general 
organizing concept with the foreseeable future, although the states will probably find it hard in 
its definition. There is some hope that it may be interpreted in a more liberal and enlightened 
form, yet the claims of the individual states that they act to the benefit of humanity as a whole, 
protecting freedom or civilization or culture may be sheer hypocrisy or a mere rationalization. 
Self-interest and national interest are by far more important sources of motivation than broader 
moral considerations, nevertheless, they can also be enlightened.       
   2.  The Two Faces of National Interest by W. David Clinton was published by Louisiana 
State University Press in 1994. The author admits the concept of national interest is so 
pervasive that one can hardly avoid coming across it in news, articles and commentary on a 
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host of subjects, yet he also agrees to the points of view by David Singer, “the national interest 
is a smokescreen by which we all too often oversimplify the world, denigrate our rivals, 
enthrall our citizens, and justify acts of dubious morality and efficacy.” (16) 
     Part one of the book is devoted to a search for definition. After a brief survey of the origins 
and development of the concept of national interest as it has been used to explain and justify the 
actions of states, this section responds to critics’ case against national interest as ambiguous 
and subjective. David Clinton points out the four dangers of the national interest: (1) the 
undemocratic national interest, in formulating of which it have played no, or at best only a 
marginal role; (2) the irrational national interest, the inability of the policy makers to achieve 
full rationality in their decisions; (3) the obsolescent national interest, for nations are 
obsolescent and their interests are illusory; (4) the exclusive national interest, excluding 
consideration of the rights and interests of most mankind.  
     In part two, the author focuses on the analysis of national interest issues in practice. All 
the four cases are after World War II, including the Marshall Plan, the Korean War, the Nixon 
Doctrine, and Carter’s human rights policy. Each of them marked a significant turn in policy, an 
occasion for the reexamination of the requirement of the national interest. From the episodes of 
the brief cases, the author tries to suggest that national interest is ubiquitous in discourse 
because it refers to something of substance and weight in the life of nations and states.  
   3.  The book National Interest, Rhetoric, Leadership, and Policy edited by W. David 
Clinton and Kenneth W. Thompson in 1988 is Volume 13 of the Exxon Education Foundation 
Series on rhetoric and political discourse. It consists of two parts by five scholars: part one, 
defining national interest, national regimes, international rules, and ethical precepts; part two, 
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national interest and national responsibilities. In the first article, Daniel G. Lang insists that “a 
foreign policy which promises to replace the struggle for power with a new era of peace and 
justice cannot succeed and must not be legitimized.” (17)  
Kenneth W. Thompson’s “Beyond National Interest” is actually a critical evaluation of 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s theory of international politics. In Thompson’s view, Niebuhr believes the 
demands of self-interest and national self-protection inspire actions that appear to override all 
accepted moral impulse. Even in the consideration of the Marshall Plan, Niebuhr calls it an act 
of wise self-interest other than an act of benevolence. As to the international organization, 
Niebuhr conceives it as essentially another framework with which historic and emergent 
national purposes might be pursued and adjusted, and it associated with the vital stakes of one 
or more major powers. David Clinton analyses the two realms of national interest—domestic 
and international. Alan Tonelson explores the reasons why Americans do not think in national 
interest terms. First, the longstanding American suspicion of power of any kind; the second, the 
importance that Americans have always attached to morality and idealism in foreign policy; the 
third, the strong predisposition to look to foreign policy in order to validate beliefs about 
domestic political issues. Inis L. Claude, Jr claims in his article “The United States and Great 
Power Responsibilities”, “theoretical preoccupation with the self-interested behavior of states 
and awkwardness in accommodating the idea of states’ responsibilities can be misleading.” (18)  
    4.  Foundations of National Power edited with introduction and other original text by 
Harold & Margaret Sprout was published by Princeton University Press in 1945. World War II 
has profoundly changed the relations of America with other nations. Some foreign policies like 
neutrality towards European wars and avoidance of military alliances with foreign powers 
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require fresh appraisal in the light of new situations. The statesman, staff officer, and the 
ordinary citizen like to achieve a clear and realist view of the current world and of the major 
trends in sight. This book aims to help Americans to frame a strategy of peace that meets the 
requirements of national security and fits the facts of world situation. It expresses the 
conviction of the editors that broad and comprehensive knowledge of the strength, the aims, 
and the policies of nations is fundamental to understanding the problem of security in a 
dynamic world. As Harold & Margaret Sprout admit this book offers no doctrine, no panaceas, 
no cut-and-dried solutions. 
 The contents of this book are collected from many sources representing many specialized 
field of knowledge, like diplomacy, political science, history, economy, demography, 
geography, physical science, engineering, journalism and military. The readings are organized 
to fit these specialties together into a pattern or mosaic that is both readily comprehensible and 
faithful to the realities of the current world and its developing trends. The frame of this book is 
divided into five parts. Part I is about the essential conditions and factors that have shaped the 
course of the international relations through the centuries. Part II, III, and IV present the pattern 
of international relations and the major political forces in Europe, Asia and America. The last 
part deals with the term of peace and the international organizations.  
 In chapter 2 of part I, Harold & Margaret Sprout provide a list of reasons why some 
nations are strong and others weak. It covers the military, territory, population, economy, 
resources, technology, organization, morality, national character and morale. It reminds us of               
another publication in 1948, Politics among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace by 
Hans. J. Morgenthau. In Chapters 8, 9, and 10 of part III of that book, Morgenthau explains and 
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illustrates the essence of national power, the elements of national power and the evaluation of 
national power. The elements of national power by Morgenthau are almost the same as the 
factors listed by Harold & Margaret Sprout, with the differences that Harold & Margaret 
focusing on the size of the territory and the number of the population, yet Morgenthau 
emphasizes the position of geography and the distribution of the population.        
    5.  The name of Hans J. Morgenthau and the name of his book Politics among Nations, the 
Struggle for Power and Peace have almost been the symbol of realism theory in international 
relations. The influence and popularity of his work can be easily seen from the seven editions 
of the publication since 1948. For over five decades, this book has been considered by many 
the premiere text in international politics. Its main themes, national interest and power, are 
commonplaces among practitioners of foreign policy. In part I of the book, Morgenthau puts 
forward the six principles of political realism, and mainly covers the theme and the contents: 
realism, object laws, human nature, the concept of interest, the term of power, objective 
category yet not once for all, moral aspirations and significance, the profound difference from 
the other schools of thoughts. He categorizes power as means to the nation’s ends, other than 
nation’s ends for power. To maintain or change the current power determines the three types of 
struggles for power: status quo, imperialism and policy of prestige. The three methods of 
imperialism are separately military, economy and culture, which provide great help in 
understanding the policies of the big powers in their grab for colonies.  
     Besides the focuses of power and balance of power, Morgenthan does not neglect the 
struggle for peace, nor does he deny moral significance and human rights. He admits that “there 
exists of necessity a certain relativism in the relation between moral principles and foreign 
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policy; one cannot overlook this if one wants to do justice to the principles of morality in 
international politics.” (19) Yet, Morgenthau insists that it is not for the United States to impose 
its own principles of government upon the rest of mankind by fire and sword, but, rather to 
attract the rest of mankind through the successful example of the United States.  
     In Chapter Five and Six, the author regards international morality, world public opinion 
and international law as “limitations of national interest”, actually they must not be the 
limitations, they can be parts of national interest instead or enforcement of national interest as 
soft power. On page 294 of Chapter 19, when mentioning the Korean War in the security issue, 
the author puts China and North Korea both in a clear-cut case of aggression. He agrees 
collective security would have required that all members of the United Nations came to the aid 
of South Korea, the victim of aggression, yet the author forgets or omits deliberately the 
security challenge that China faced, when in September, 1950, American forces succeeded in 
amphibious landing in Inchon and then crossed the 38th parallel to the border of China. China 
was forced to intervene in the Korean War in November.       
  6.  The book of Contending Theories of International Relations is a comprehensive 
survey by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. The fifth edition of this book in 
2001 implies the wide use by teachers and students in international relations courses in 
America and abroad. With the emergence of new literature and the continuing development in 
the field, the authors have revised the text throughout and updated the notes.  
Out of the twelve chapters, almost eight chapters explore realism theories, from realist 
to neorealist and neoclassical realist theory, from system and structure to social context, from 
old theories of conflict and war to microcosmic theories and international war, from theories of 
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deterrence to game theories and decision making. The authors define classical realism with 
national interest and power, structural realism as neorealism, and social constructivism as 
neoclassical realism. As to the limitation of realism, this book agrees that realist writers only 
focus on the past Eurocentric system and draw a series of political concepts for the analysis of 
a vastly different contemporary global international system. Yet, “despite its critics, realism 
ranks as the most important attempt thus far to isolate and focus on a key variable in political 
behavior—namely, power –and to develop a theory of international relations.” (20)   
     Liberalism is only briefly mentioned in Chapter 9, international political economy, with 
three pages’ introduction of the early development of capitalism. Chapter 10 is about the theory 
of international cooperation and integration, functionalism and neofuntionalism. The related 
issues of international morality, legalism, value system, ideology and human rights are not 
mentioned at all, which make the survey of this book somewhat incomprehensive.    
7.  The Idea of National Interest, an Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy by 
Charles A. Beard was published in 1934. This book is one of the earliest works about American 
national interest, and even today its ideas look so profound and significant. Charles A. Beard is 
one of America’s most distinguished historians. He served as president of both the American 
Historical Association and the American Political Science Association. When the book first 
appeared, it helped to stimulate the regrowth of the idea of “national interest”, as well as 
providing its genealogy. This book remains unique in its field by developing the theme and 
defining and investigating a formula by which governments supposedly live and for which men 
are still asked to die.  
 The concept of national interest is an European strain of thought. It has been appealed to 
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in America from the very beginning of that country, though it appeared sporadically or tacitly, 
other than the center point of the argumentation. Charles Beard expresses his hope that national 
interest as a new conception, with positive core and nebulous implications will find its 
“formulation at the hands of a statesman as competent and powerful as Hamilton or Jefferson.” 
(21) After Beard’s death, the concept of national interest was thus gaining strength abroad and 
receiving a greater attention in the United States. From presidential statements, it can be seen 
that Truman and Eisenhower rarely employed the phrase, yet John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. 
Johnson more often stressed that they would do everything they could to ask both parties to be 
responsible and to act in the national interest.  
Charles Beard begins his book with the assertion that “foreign policies are not built upon 
abstractions. They are the result of practical conceptions of national interest arising from some 
immediate exigency or standing out vividly in historical perspective.” “Self-interest is not only 
a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy; one which needs no cloak of 
hypocrisy. As a principle it does not require justification in general statement.” “It is just as true 
as ever that it is vain to expect governments to act continuously on any other ground than 
national interest.”(22) Then the author states the American Constitution is as a conception of 
national interest, and he explains how national interest manifested in America’s territorial 
expansion in the Continent, in commercial expansion, including the commercial relations with 
China, national interest in action, the moral obligation of national interest, the interpretation, 
advancement, enforcement and challenges of national interest. In this book, the concept and the 
goals of American national interest penetrate all the history of American foreign relations.    
 8.  Warren I. Cohen’s America’s Response to China, a History of Sino-American 
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Relations, 3rd edition, is one of the best U.S.-China relations works. Not only does it narrate 
many interesting episodes in the intercourse of these two countries, with its wide range from 
the 1784 Empress of China sail to the rapprochement and normalization in 1979, but also it is 
full of the author’s insightful analysis and generalization, which exemplifies the inductive 
conceptualization of national interest and power from the versatile data of historical context. 
The narrative is brief, the conclusion is concise, the remark is cogent, the opinion is unbiased.  
 Since the first edition, the author focuses his attention on the American response to China, 
compared to John K. Fairbank’s The United States and China that focuses on introduction to 
China. In Warren’s view, American response mainly came from the American statesmen who 
sought to devise an East Asian policy, consistent with the ideals and interests of American 
people, and embedded in a broad international setting. After the second edition of the book, the 
author traveled to the mainland China nine times. He interviewed Chinese leaders and 
exchanged opinions with the privileged Chinese scholars who accessed to policy-making 
process. The declassification of many documents also has provided new insights into his 
thoughts about the policies of the Presidents and their secretaries of state.  
 This book covers most of the significant events of U.S.-China relations, from tribute 
system, treaty system, America as a Power in East Asia, Japanese factor, Chinese Civil War, 
communism in China, to hostility and rapprochement. The book points out power and change 
of power functioned in the transition from tribute system to treaty system, America’s words of 
sympathy yet lack of material support when China needed help, America’s discrepancy 
between the theory and practice in the exclusion and discrimination of Chinese immigration 
from the 1860s to the 1880s, America’s self-interest in the “Open Door” policy, Theodore 
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Roosevelt’s balance of power policy in China, Wilson’s high morality and his giving in, 
Franklin Roosevelt’s indifference to China’s sufferings and his sacrifice of China’s territory to 
the Soviet Union. From many events, it is concluded America’s self-national interest has 
always been considered as the top priority in America’s response to China.          
9.  One book is very similar to Warren I. Cohen’s America’s Response to China in 
structure, content, style, and even in remark. This is the book entitled as The United States and 
China by Arnold Xiangze Jiang, who is from China. This book reflects U.S. relations with 
China from the perspective of a Chinese. Jiang is from Guizhou Province of South China, 
attended the University of Nanjing in Chengdu, China and earned his Ph. D from the 
University of Washington in the United States in 1951. Drawing on primary and secondary 
Chinese and U.S. sources, Jiang offers the reader the critical insight into the Chinese 
interpretation of events, other than the traditional American perspective. An awareness of the 
different interpretations that two nations draw from a set of shared event is crucial for 
understanding the bilateral relations.  
 In this book, the first and most central theme is that, between the two aims that defined 
U.S. policy towards China—a generous friendship and an aggressive self-interest—the latter 
dominated. For example, Jiang argues that the “Open Door” policy was a tool to enhance 
America’s economic dominance and to open up the way for an American hegemony in the Far 
East. The second theme of the book is that America was a consistent supporter of corrupt, 
unpopular, and repressive regimes in China. The third theme developed by Jiang is that 
America often involved in contradictions and unrealities in its pursuit of friendship and 
self-interest. Whether you agree or not to the author’s point of view, this book broadens and 
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deepens the reader’s understanding of U.S. relations with China, which is also of great 
importance for the future.  
10.  During the nineteenth century when China grew older and weaker, the United 
States grew stronger and richer. In the twentieth century when China emerged as a communist 
state from revolution, the United States emerged as the leader of the anti-communist Western 
bloc. The history of U.S.-China relations has been ubiquitously full of misconceptions, 
distortions, confusions, illusions, disillusions, dreams, myths, prejudices, and half-truths. The 
book The United States Odyssey in China, 1784-1990 by Charles R. Kitts in 1991 gives a good 
starting point, good explanation and also good analysis to the study of U.S. relations with 
China. The author emphasizes the American role in the intercourse of the two countries and 
focuses on Western sources. At the end of each chapter, the book provides a list of further 
reading for reference. Most of the chapters present detailed accounts of the events that occurred, 
with the exception of the last chapter that gives a brief description of the “recognition and 
beyond” period from 1969 to 1990 within only twenty pages.    
The author mentions more realism and less emotionalism are urgently needed in the 
study of U.S-China relations, and his attempt in this book provides a starting point that may 
alter and improve matters. In Chapter Four and Chapter Nine, Charles R. Kitts admits that both 
Anson Burlingame and Woodrow Wilson were sincere and well-intentioned, however they too 
were out of touch with the politics of the real world. He criticizes the strong prejudice and 
racism of the California legislative committee in the anti-Chinese immigration issue in the 
1880s, compares the “Open China Door” policy with “Shut America Door” to Chinese, points 
out the self-centered interest of America when facing more Japanese demands in China, 
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ridicules the treaties signed at the Washington Conference as toothless, agrees to the Chinese 
complaints in the 1930s that America only helped with words but no force, doubts the clamor 
of “red China menace ”, explores the wrong judgment of American government to China’s 
intervention in Korea, and analyses the rigidity of John Dulles’ China policy.  
11.  Another book, Aspects of Sino-American Relations since 1784 edited by Thomas H. 
Etzold was published in 1978, one year before the diplomatic normalization of American and 
China. The book comprises of six essays by six different authors who focus on the haziness of 
American policy in the Far East, and its confusing legacy. The first chapter by William J. 
Brinker discusses the meager understanding of Chinese culture in the first phase of American 
trade contact with China. Chapter Two by Frederick B. Hoyt and Eugene P. Trani highlights the 
stark contrast of the American discrimination against Chinese immigration to the “Open Door” 
policy the American government simultaneous demanded from China, which showed a major 
contradiction between the domestic and foreign policies of the United States.  
Raymond A. Esthus states in Chapter Three that from the history since 1899 to 1922, 
American “Open Door” policy seemed more ambiguous other than clear and consistent. 
Chapters Four and Five by David F. Trask and Thomas H. Etzold demonstrate the 
inconsistency of American foreign policy towards China due to the unexpected and 
uncontrollable circumstances after the two World Wars. The authors blame the post-war 
problems more to the circumstances than to the policy makers’ lack of proper assessment and 
proper decision. In the last chapter, Jerome K. Holloway and Thomas H. Etzold conclude from 
American relations with Chinese leaders since the 1920s to the 1970s that Chinese 
self-centered attitudes impeded the normal relations between the two countries. The authors 
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believe that the United States was prepared to treat China like a world power, but China refused 
to respond as one. But the authors seem forgetting American “isolation and containment” 
policy towards China from the 1950s to the 1970s and American ignorance of the existence of 
the 800 million people in “Red China”. As the authors mention, “relations between countries 
are always a mixture of positive and negative, of good will and irritation, conflicts of interest 
and convergences of interest.” (23) The authors’ confusions in their points of view and in the 
events of U.S. relations with China are due to their lack of analysis from the perspective of 
national interest, and their lack of the guideline of classical realism theory.     
12.  The ten years from 1945 to 1955 represents a critical turning point in the history of 
contemporary international relations. With the end of World War II emerged the transition of 
competition for dominance among the traditional European Powers to the new international 
system of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The deterioration of the 
relationship between America and China is the result of such a new international order. 
Particularly, this decade witnessed the most difficult and hostile period in U.S.-relations with 
China. The War in Korea, the further military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, the worsening 
of mutual diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, all made the two countries enemies for a 
quarter of century. Proper understanding of this period is essential if Washington and Beijing 
are to avoid similar conflicts in the future, for some of the mutual misunderstanding that 
contributed to the deterioration of the two countries in the late 1940s still exerts its influence 
sporadically on contemporary relations of both sides. With more archival materials declassified 
through the mid-1950s from American government and the availability of some firsthand 
material of the Chinese side, the time has come for a scholarly assessment of the evolution of 
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the relationship between China and America for the critical decade, and then came the book 
Sino-American Relations 1945-1955 edited by Harry Harding and Yuan Ming.     
 This book comprises of seventeen articles focusing on different points, the historical 
setting, difficult choices, years of confrontation and the legacy of the decade. The authors are a 
group of senior American and Chinese scholars in U.S.-China relations, including John Lewis 
Gaddis, Steven M. Goldstein, Steven I. Levine, Robert L. Messer, Jonathan D.Pollack, William 
Stueck, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Chen Xiaolu, He Di, Jia Qingguo, Rao Geping, Tao Wenzhao, 
Wang Jisi, Zhang Baijia. In this book, there are lots of insightful analyses and revisionist’s 
views about Chinese Communist Party’s ideology and its relations with Moscow. 
13.  The week when Nixon visited China and talked with Mao in February 1972 really 
changed the world. This was not only the first ever visit of an American president to China as 
symbolism, it also ended the long standoff where neither country had recognized the other. “It 
was an earthquake in the Cold War landscape and meant that the Eastern bloc no longer stood 
firm against the West.” (24) How did that happen and why did the both sides of America and 
China make such a drastic and dramatic change in their foreign policy? What did Nixon and 
Mao talk about and what impact did this stunt have to U.S.-China relations? The book Nixon 
and Mao by Margaret MacMillan gives us an excellent answer.   
 Based on the focus on this significant event, the author envisages all the aspects that 
concern this concurrence, including both of the two countries’ domestic situations, the current 
international relations, the past vicissitude of misunderstanding and hostility, the introduction 
of Chinese history and the development of Chinese communism, the episodes in the political 
careers of Nixon, Mao and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese premier. All these factors together combine 
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a vivid mosaic for better understanding of U.S. foreign policies towards China.  
Margaret MacMillan received her Ph. D from Oxford University and her work Paris 1919: 
Six Months that Changed the World won her international reputation. The book Nixon and Mao 
was published in 2007 and included the latest documents of both the United States and China. 
Besides the inspiring narratives, this book is also full of insightful analysis and is intended to 
justify the argument of national interest and power struggle in the realism theory. According to 
the author, the first goal of Nixon administration was to support American interest. As Nixon 
said, “the more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others’ interests, the 
more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have 
commitments; we have commitments because we involved. Our interests must shape our 
commitments, rather than the other way around.” (25) For both America and China, the talk 
between Nixon and Mao in 1972 provided a counterbalance to potential enemies: Japan and the 
Soviet Union in the case of China; the Soviet Union, above all, for the United States, especially 
at that time when America was dragged into the Vietnam War that diminished the dominance of 
American power in the East Asia and in the world.        
14.  U.S.-China relation is today the most difficult bilateral relationship for America and 
one of the most important bilateral relationships for the world. The United States and China 
share many interests in common and as well as many divergent interests. The China policy 
debates have been one of the most contentious debates in America. The participants and issues 
may have changed, yet the theme has remained the same: how should America approach this 
very complex and very important nation? The book China Cross Talk edited by Scott Kennedy 
provides a wide-range of collection of articles, speeches, and documents on U.S.-China 
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relations since the diplomatic normalization in 1979. The polemics reflects the diversity and 
intensity of American policy debates about China based on each individual’s subjective 
interpretation of American interests and other factors.  
There are five fundamental issues concern America among this book’s selections: 
China’s power, China’s foreign policy intentions, China’s domestic political and economic 
situations, China’s help to American goals and China’s behavior with liberal means. Six 
periods are grouped according to a key event from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush’s 
administration. The weak point of this book is the limited attention to Chinese perspectives on 
the relations in general or on American policy.  
One interesting phenomenon we can see from the arguments is that almost all the 
presidents have been far more critical and hard-line toward China as candidates than as 
occupants of the White House. The reasons why presidents’ going soft on China might be 
China’s transforming in the interim, the change of president’s view, the expediency for more 
votes to be won, or president’s policy failure.  
As to the issue of American interest, President Reagan said during his visit to China in 
April 1984, “A strong China, dedicated to peace, clearly is in the best interest of international 
stability and in the best interest of the United States.” (26) President Clinton asserted in 1997, 
“The emergence of a China as a power that is stable, open, and nonaggressive, that embraces 
free markets, political pluralism, and the rule of law, that works with us to build a secure 
international order, that kind of China, rather than a China turned inward and confrontational, 
is deeply in the interests of the American people.” (27) The United States has a profound 
interest in promoting a peaceful, prosperous, and stable world, in peace and stability in Asia, in 
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keeping weapons of mass destruction and other sophisticated weaponry out of unstable regions 
and away from rouge states and terrorist, in fighting drug trafficking and international 
organized crime, in making global trade and investment as free, fair, and open as possible, and 
in protecting global environment and climate. American interests and values can be advanced 
fundamentally by working with China, expanding areas of cooperation and dealing forthrightly 
with the differences.  
15.  As to how American power or American superpower applied in the practice of U.S. 
relations with China, especially with the communist China since 1949, how the two powers 
clashed, collided, struggled, balanced, cooperated and then competed, the book The Practice of 
Power, U.S. Relations with China since 1949 by Rosemary Foot, provides a good 
demonstration by its case study analysis. The argument of the book is based on a wider 
structure of relationships at the global and domestic levels; it also embraced areas other than 
bilateral concerns about the global strategic balance, which deepens our understanding of the 
evolution in American policies to China. From the concept of power, America as hegemon, to 
power and U.S.-China relations, the author concludes that the United State has been the center 
of China’s foreign policy concerns both negatively and positively post 1949. It is the U.S. 
position in the global system, its structural power, allowed Washington to keep Beijing 
relatively isolated. America’s recognition as equal and diplomatic normalization seemed one of 
the most priorities to China.  
  The People’s Republic of China was blocked out of the United Nations from 1949 to 
1971, and was deprived of her permanent seat in the Security Council. The issue of communist 
China’s claiming representation at U.N. can be seen clearly as an area where the United States 
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used its command power to maintain a policy reflecting its interests, utilizing both coercive as 
well as persuasive means. The topic of this case study is a very good complement to the 
argument of my paper. Rosemary Foot also mentions American trade embargo to China and 
U.S. public opinions, American power balancing against threats in the rise and fall of the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance, America’s perception of China’s conventional military power and 
nuclear power, U.S. structural power and China’s rising power after 1979.     
16.  Contrary to the skepticism about the contribution of the concept of national interest 
to public policy, Karl Von Vorys, the author of the book American National Interest, Virtue and 
Power in Foreign Policy, proposes to develop national interest as a pre-policy standard, a 
common base for foreign policy and its evaluation.  
According to the author, the concept of national interest cannot be vague and abstract, it 
must gain content and acquire an identifiable structure. American national interest needs to 
spell out its hierarchy quite unambiguously: (1) challenges to American vital interest, 
American national existence; (2) challenges to American special interests, American friends 
and allies; (3) challenges to American general interests, international order. When talking about 
American vital interest, the author mentions Americans may be driven by altruism or 
motivated by enlightened self-interest, but in American national interest these sacrifices must 
stop short of sacrificing the United States for any purpose, however exalted. To avoid 
becoming targets of aggression, three preconditions can be identified and analyzed: hostility, 
capability and utility. As to American special interest, two conditions make it particularly 
strenuous: being ephemeral and being imprecise. The author lists reasons for American general 
interest: American domestic reality will no longer permit a policy of splendid isolation; 
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America has reached the age of global interdependence; U.S. government should actively 
participate in, perhaps even lead, the efforts toward a stable international order. It looks the 
author forget mentioning American power or superpower has enabled the policy- makers to 
hold such general interest.    
 The author reminds the readers that national interest does not shut out the universalist 
perspective, and does not disregard the interests of mankind, nor does it delegitimize the 
personal and group perspectives. Yet the author does not include ideology, value system and 
human rights as part of American soft power and American national interest. It is difficult to 
identify and classify the range of appropriate policy options. The author believes as to whether 
some kinds of national interest worth America to fight, to pay, to work or even to leave it alone, 




CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
     This thesis uses the qualitative method to analyze the phenomena and events in U.S. 
relations with China and to develop important observations and conclusions. The qualitative 
method is the traditional approach in the analysis of classical realism. It has its origins in 
history, sociology and anthropology, and is particularly useful when the goal of research is to 
explore people’s subjective experiences and the meanings they attach to those experiences. 
    The nature of qualitative research lies with the assumption that meaning, implication, 
understanding and the way of interpretation are all socially constructed as individuals interact 
with the world. Some fields and phenomena in society are abstract, intuitive, value-oriented 
and non-quantifiable and thus unsuitable for positivist and quantitative research. Over a period 
of time, the constructions and interpretations of reality may be in a state of change. “Qualitative 
researchers are interested in understanding what those interpretations are at a particular point in 
time and in a particular context. Learning how individuals experience and interact with their 
social world, the meaning it has for them, is considered an interpretive qualitative approach.” 
(28)   
Interpretative and qualitative research designs include several key characteristics. The 
first characteristic is that researchers strive to understand the meaning people have constructed 
about their world and their experiences. The second characteristic is that the researcher is the 
primary instrument for data collection and data analysis. The third element is that the process is 
inductive, which means the researcher gathers data to build concepts, hypotheses, or theories 
rather than deductively deriving postulates or hypotheses to be tested. Finally, the product of a 
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qualitative inquiry is richly descriptive. Words and pictures rather than numbers are used to 
convey what the researcher has learned about a phenomenon.  
As an analogue, this paper with interpretative qualitative research design first explains 
and interprets the meaning and understanding that has been constructed in U.S. relations with 
China. American national interest and power stand out in the historical relations with China, 
with the occasional focus on ideology, value differences and human rights only masking the 
real concerns of national interest and power. Second, data collection and data analysis covers 
the major incidents and important policies since 1784 to 2009. Third, by employing inductive 
reasoning the paper supports the hypothesis and theoretical conclusion that national interest 
and national power are central or core concerns in U.S.-China relations. Finally, this research 
employs mainly descriptive and narrative analysis and critique.  
The qualitative research approach includes several types: first, critical qualitative 
research, which focuses on how the social and political aspects of the situation shape the reality. 
Second, there is postmodern or post-structural that questions all aspects of the construction of 
reality; what it is and what it is not, how it is organized, and so on. Third, qualitative research 
considers phenomenology, which focuses on culture, on the essence or structure of an 
experience. Fourth, there is grounded theory that derives inductively from data. Fifth, case 
study, that is an intensive description and analysis of a phenomenon or social unit such as an 
individual, group, institution, or community. Sixth, there is ethnographic study of  human 
society and culture. Seventh is the narrative analysis, the use of stories as data, biography, 
autobiography, life history, oral history, and life narratives.   
     The quantitative method, on the other hand, rests on the observation and measurement of 
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repeated incidences of political phenomenon, such as voting, allocation of resources by 
government or citizens’ attitudes towards a policy. With this method, the researcher draws 
inferences based on the data at hand and the laws of probability. It strives for natural 
science-like rigor and certitude within the social sciences and humanities, and often involves 
the reduction of concepts, variables and situations into quantitative forms. The quantitative 
approach seeks to discover causal relationships by using descriptive and inferential statistical 
methods, survey instruments, and other tools. In this thesis, three tables are presented to further 
amplify and strengthen the basically qualitative arguments. 
     Table one is about the comparison of the total investments of the big Powers in China in 
the years of 1902, 1914 and 1931. From the figures we find a phenomenon that America was 
almost the least in investments in China during that period compared to Britain, Japan, Russia, 
France and Germany, yet it is interesting that this happened even at the time when minimum 
U.S. interest and involvement in China in 1902, three years after the United States initiated the 
“Open Door” policy to the big powers status in 1899. America just won the War on Spain, and 
obtained Cuba in Caribbean and the Philippines in Asia, which symbolized America’s new 
position in the East Asia and her influence in the world. The success of John Hay’s policy 
indicated not only the emerging power of America, but also the beginning of more America’s 
share of interests in China’s trade and investment. The figure in 1914 shows that President 
Taft’s “dollar diplomacy” began to work, with more America’s loans to China’s big 
construction contracts. The comparison of the figures between America and Japan in 
1931shows us clearly the drastic increase of Japanese investments in China, and also helps us 
understand the relative advantage of Japan over America in China’s Manchuria area and the 
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reasons of American appeasement policy when Japan began to invade China from 1931.    
     Table two demonstrates the importance of American exports to China and Japan from 
1932 to 1940, when Japan escalated from enlarged invasion in China to the full scale war with 
China in 1937, until the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. From the figures, we see the 
values of American exports to China remained all the same from $56 million to $78 million 
during the year from 1932 to 1940, yet the American exports to Japan almost doubled from 
$135 million to $227 million in the same period. The percentage of total U.S. export trade to 
China decreased by half, yet the percentage to Japan remained almost the same. One may 
induce from this table that America did little to help when China was under Japanese invasion 
and needed help; and instead, America exported more than before to Japan, including the war 
material oil and steel, which actually helped the aggressor and hurt the victim.  
      Table three compares the projected GDP and the defense budgets of China, America and 
OECD countries from 2005 to 2030. The projection shows us that China’s overall GDP in 
purchasing power will overtake that of America in the year of 2020 by $ 30 trillion to $ 28 
trillion. The Chinese military budgets will increase by four times from $60 billion to $238 
billion from 2003 to 2030, yet American military budgets will increase by two times. The table 
presents a clear picture that China is emerging as a great power not only in economy and also in 
military, which is a doubtless reality and challenge that America will have to face. Based on the 
historical research of U.S. relations with China, it is essential and vital to rethink and 
recalculate current and future American foreign policy towards China, in order to maintain and 
best promote American national interests and the international prestige through a realistic 






CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTS AND THEORIES  
    
“Realism is the dominant theory of International Relations.” (29) It provides the most 
powerful explanation for the state of war and the rise and fall of great powers. The unifying 
themes of realism include the nation state as the actor; national sovereignty, security, survival 
and interests as the ultimate goal; balance of power and alliance in a state of anarchy as the key 
strategy; balance of terror as the method of temporary truce; dominance, hegemony and 
polarity as the types of international system structure; change, method and calculation as the 
policy. The great nineteenth century British statesman Lord Palmerston formulated the credo of 
realists: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal, 
and those interests it is our duty to follow.” (30) 
     Realism can be viewed from three aspects: classical realism, structural realism and 
neoclassical realism. Classical realism emphasizes the endless power struggle and its roots in 
human nature. “The war has its origin in dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche.” (31) 
People organize the state, and the state makes people what they are. Like man is born with the 
nature of survival and self-interest, violence is common in a society. So when a state pursues its 
own interests, force is used when necessary. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of 
states because there is no final authority for the conflict of interests in the state of international 
anarchy. A foreign policy based on this image is neither moral nor immoral, it embodies merely 
a reasoned response to the world. War is politics with blood, and politics is a bloodless war. 
“States are natural enemies not because states are never honorable and peaceful, but because 
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they may at any moment become dishonorable and belligerent.” (32) 
Power refers to the material resources available to a nation, while interests refer to a 
nation’s goals or preferences. A state leader has to accept or adapt to the changing power of 
political configurations in world politics. Justice and law only play a limited role on the world 
stage. Just like the nineteenth century is sometimes seen as the golden age of international order, 
and of mythologies of laissez-faire, free trade, and freedom of the seas during the Pax 
Britannica, in reality Britain was never reluctant to apply military force when necessary to 
maintain and enforce such norms. Historian Thucydides wrote in The Peloponnesian War, “the 
stronger do what they want to and the weaker accept what they have to”, and “the growth of 
Athenian power caused the fear in Sparta.” (33) In his book The Prince, Machiavelli says the 
prince “must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of 
fortune dictate, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if constrained” 
for “morality is the product of power.” (34) E. H. Carr holds that “theories of international 
morality are, for the same reason and in virtue of the same process, the product of dominant 
nations or groups of nations.” (35) Morgenthau states in his Politics among Nations, “all history 
shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively 
involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war” (36) and a nation defines 
its interests “in terms of power.” (37)  
Structural realism emphasizes that the anarchy of the international system fosters fear, 
jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity among the states. As Kenneth N. Waltz points out in his 
book Theory of International Politics, “The national realm is variously described as being 
hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived; the international realm, 
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as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually 
adaptive”,(38) so the force of a national government is exercised in the name of right and justice 
domestically, yet the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and 
advantage internationally. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye emphasize power and 
interdependence, “the world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in 
human aspiration” that are creating a “world without borders”. (39)  
Neoclassical realism focuses on the necessity of better accounts of the unit level variables, 
such as how power is perceived and how leadership is exercised. To achieve their objectives 
and maintain their security, units like people, corporations, and states must rely on the means 
they can generate and the arrangements they can make in a condition of anarchy. State structure, 
scope, and capacity are crucial factors in explaining the process how nations become 
increasingly active on the world stage. Capabilities shape intentions, but state structure limits 
the availability of national power. Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its 
government, so what matters is state power. Fareed Zakaria gives a better description about 
American expansion in his From Wealth to Power, “ranging from the balance of power to the 
influence of various interest groups to ideology—racism or social Darwinism or manifest 
destiny—to the idiosyncrasies of America’s leaders.” (40)  
Apart from realism, international theories consist of liberalism, globalism and 
constructivism. Liberalism is a tradition of political thought composed of a set of practical 
goals and ideals. It is interchangeably called pluralism or idealism. For classical liberal 
theorists, the individual is the most important unit of analysis and the state is to play a minimal 
role as arbiter in a liberal society. “The liberal outlook can be summed up in the four concepts 
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of ‘equality’, ‘rationality’, ‘liberty’ and ‘property’.” (41) Liberalism is also classified as 
commercial liberalism of international economy expansion, democratic liberalism of domestic 
public opinion and regulatory liberalism of international law and organizations. (42) The most 
influential scholars on liberalism are Adam Smith, David Ricardo and their works in 
economics, and in the political economic realm are John Locke and Immanuel Kant.    
Globalism emphasizes dependency and the capitalist world system. Resource, market and 
colony are the concepts often mentioned. Constructivism believes “state action influenced by 
‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) 
and institutions.” (43) As Alexander Wendt points out anarchy is what states make of it and 
“identities are the basis of interests.” (44) 
Most national policy-makers claim themselves to be realists. Then how has international 
relation theory, especially the realism theory been applied to and revealed in the issues of 
American foreign policies, especially its policies towards China? “History serves as a rich data 
base for constructing theories about how the world operates," (45) and for the past two hundred 
and twenty-five years since the first contact, U.S.-China relations have been studded with 
many episodes of major wars and diplomatic events that bear important messages for 
contemporary policy makers.  
     There are many works on international relations theory and on U.S.-China relations, yet 
few combine the abstract assumptions and explanations of the international relations theories 
with the dramatic ups and downs between America and China. Theory should derive from the 
empirical observations, and reflect, explain, instruct and even predict the reality. As great 
theory reveals its vital importance and instruction through the verification of the actual and 
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complete occurrences, realism provides a persuasive answer to U.S.-China relations as seen 
through the historical facts and realities of what happened, what is happening, and even what 
may happen. This paper will analyze and justify how realism has been central and critical to the 
history and process of America-China policy. Based on key historical events and the changing 
correlations of power, the two hundred and twenty five years of U.S.-China relations can be 
organized in three periods.  
The first period covers 1784 to 1899, when America developed from a new republic to 
a great power, and shifted from its commercial priority to imperialist orientation. At the same 
time, China deteriorated from a powerful empire to a semi-colonial pariah. The second period 
focuses on 1900 to 1949, and U.S. emphasizes on “dollar diplomacy” and “neutral diplomacy” 
in the power struggle for global dominance. In the same period, however, Chinese power 
shifted from empire to republic and became weakened by civil wars. The third period spans 
1950 to 2009, when American superpower status prevailed and Chinese power was revived and 
increasing.     
      From the major events that occurred, it is obvious that most incidents in U.S. foreign 
policy have been directly or indirectly related to power struggle and national interest issues, 
with only several cases related to ideological disputes. For example, Taiping Rebellion was 
characterized by the indigenous Christian belief-system. However, America and other Western 
powers determined that their interests rested more with the Manchu government than the 
similar pseudo Christian Taiping ideology. The 1870s’ anti-Chinese immigration issue showed 
the great discrepancy between the theory and practice of American ideals and realist interests. 
Wilson’s “self-determination” was doubted when he gave in to Japan’s greedy demands for 
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control over the territory of China. Franklin Roosevelt did not stop selling oil and steel to Japan 
until the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack. McCarthyism was a shameful and destructive episode 
in the history of the United States. The human rights issue after the 1989 incident in Tiananmen 
Square yielded to the mutual economic benefits and the continuation of China’s most favored 
nation (MFN) status. These events demonstrate that above all, national interests are the most 
vital priority for the state, and that realism is the driving force for relations among nations. 
National strength is the best way to guarantee the interests of a nation, and power determines 




CHAPTER FIVE: FROM COMMERCIALISM TO IMPERIALISM  
(1784-1899) 
 
     Almost as soon as winning the independence from Great Britain, the Americans wasted 
little time in reaching the Chinese market. The cargo ship, Empress of China sailed out of New 
York, went around Cape Horn and directly headed to Guangdong (Canton), China in 1784. 
“The modest profits of this voyage excited emulation. Other ports and merchants, particularly 
in New England, took up the trade to China.” (46) In those first years of American involvement 
in China, the American government played a minimal role, consistent with the fundamental 
American policy of seeking to extend trade without much political complications. As private 
businessmen in quest of wealth, they made their own way to China, took their risks, operated 
within the Chinese permission and adopted a policy of respect of Chinese sovereignty and 
authorities, which their trade and fortune depended on. There were no treaties, nor diplomatic 
relations between the governments of China and of the United States.  
    By the time of the first American trade with China, the conditions imposed by the Chinese 
government on the Western merchants were the tribute system, which had long been a vehicle 
for trade. Since ancient times, the Chinese people were very ethnocentric, considering their 
realm the center of the universe, the Middle Kingdom, and regarded all cultural differences as 
signs of inferiority. All who were not Chinese were treated as barbarians, no matter where they 
came from, whether they were Inner Asian tribesmen or Europeans and Americans arriving by 
sea. The relations with the “barbarians” had been regulated under the tribute system. 
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Theoretically, all peoples in contact with China were tributaries. The procedures for this form 
of contact had been highly ritualized and the “barbarian” envoys had to pay homage to the 
Chinese emperor.  
 American businessmen remained in China, though they were restricted to a small area of 
Guangdong, without protection from American government. Obviously, the profits were worth 
the bother, even in the period of the Terranova affair in 1821. (47) An Italian sailor named 
Francis Terranova aboard the American ship Emily was seized and executed by Chinese 
authorities, for he was charged responsible for the death of a woman by discarding a jar from 
the ship. The American business community decided to allow Terranova to be seized after a 
show of protest. After the death sentence was carried out, the American government did not 
protest and the Americans in Guangdong were commended by the local officials for their 
properly submissive behavior.  
  From the point of power comparison, the United States entered Chinese tribute system 
within one year after her independence, at a time when America was still weak, yet the Manchu 
dynasty’s strength was at its peak and Chinese power was strong enough to control the relations 
with America and Europe. So long as the Chinese retained this position of relative strength, 
they treated Westerners at their own will, so in the latter days, the Americans responded the 
same way when the shift of power became irresistible and regrettable to China. Besides, 
according to Charles Beard, American moral obligation in national interest kept the 
government of the United States to follow the practice of recognizing de facto governments, 
avoiding a judgment upon their wisdom, their virtues, or their domestic policies. Always 
holding an even balance, America did business with the haughty Emperor of China, guided by 
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the policy of non-intervention and bent on safeguarding national interest, practically viewed.       
In the 1830s, during the administration of Andrew Jackson, the American government 
sought to expand trade relations with China on a treaty basis. Edmund Roberts, “a pioneer in 
America’s Far Eastern diplomacy”, (48) was sent on a mission to find new commercial 
opportunities in the Orient. Roberts reached China in November 1832 but failed in establishing 
communication with the local Chinese authorities, except to receive an order to set sail 
immediately. Also in the 1830s, the first American missionaries visited China despite of the 
harsh conditions. These efforts gave a new and increasingly important dimension to the 
interests of America in China, for religious involvement inspired some of the American desires 
to find a place for the Chinese in the Kingdom of God.  
China that time was a limitless market with about four hundred million people, yet at the 
same time, the American merchants also felt the pressure of finding some merchandises to sell. 
They just had limited markets for their furs, sandalwood, and ginseng, and they failed to match 
the value of the items the Americans sought to purchase. Some of the businessmen were 
involved in the sales of opium to China, though English merchants were largely responsible for 
the opium trade, and they succeeded in petitioning their government for military support. Very 
soon the opium trade became a critical problem for the Chinese government，for it “was 
draining China of specie and impoverishing the country.” (49)  
Before the Opium War, industrialization and the growth of nationalism had made the 
West more powerful and more assertive in dealing with China, and the Manchu dynasty had 
passed the peak of its power and began to decline, yet the Chinese mandarins remained still 
arrogant and ignorant without perceiving that the Westerners had become powerful enough to 
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demand diplomatic equality. The balance of power had shifted, yet the Chinese government 
was reluctant to conceive of this and couldn’t escape the humiliation in the century that 
followed.  
 As early as May 1839, American merchants in China petitioned Congress for a 
commissioner to negotiate a commercial treaty—and for warships to keep the natives friendly. 
Congress took no action, yet Commodore Lawrence Kearny and the East India Squadron were 
ordered to the vicinity of Chinese waters. Finding the American merchants in no danger, 
Kearny refrained from interfering in the Anglo-Chinese war, yet he “requested of the Chinese 
authorities that American merchants be put on the same footing as those of the nation most 
favored.” (50)  
The administration of President John Tyler didn’t have a clear mandate concerning with 
the China trade policy and continued inaction. Yet Dr. Peter Parker, a medical missionary to 
China, related by marriage to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, had been in Washington 
urging a diplomatic mission. Congress finally voted $40,000 for a special mission, and Caleb 
Cushing, a former Whig Congressman was named to be the commissioner to China and 
followed by four warships.  
On July 3, 1844, Caleb Cushing and Qiying (Ch’i-ying), imperial commissioner of the 
Emperor Daoguang (Tao Kuang), signed the “Peace, Amity and Commerce Treaty” at Wangxia, 
a village near Macao. “The Treaty of Wangxia imposed on China more concrete and harsher 
obligations in regard to extraterritoriality, fixed tariff duties, unilateral most favored nation 
treatment, revision of the treaty after twelve years and permission for American warships to 
enter China’s ports.” (51) The Americans, without firing a shot, were able to expand their 
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commercial operations along the coast of China. The American flag followed the British to the 
treaty ports, and as junior partners, the Americans followed the British for the rest of the 
century. 
Having acquired a treaty of its own, the government of the United States did little to 
implement it. After July 1844, Americans had access to five Chinese ports and in accordance 
with the treaty’s provisions for extraterritoriality, the American consuls in these ports had sole 
jurisdiction over Americans accused of crimes in China, but no American consular service was 
set up in China until mid-1850s. In the interim, American merchants in the treaty ports carried 
on business as usual, providing consuls out of their own ranks, occasionally from the very 
firms involved in the opium trade. The British and their subjects continued to dominate trade, 
but the Americans offered increasing competition, particularly in the carrying trade. During the 
early 1850s in China, Americans carried about one third of China’s trade to the West, with her 
only twenty five firms out of the approximately two hundred Western businesses. And of the 
burgeoning trade of Shanghai, rapidly becoming the major treaty port, American ships carried 
fully half. (52)   
In 1856，Dr. Peter Parker was named American commissioner to China. He preferred the 
technique developed by British when dealing with China: firmness was essential and force had 
to be used where necessary. Parker also developed a plan for more American involvement in 
China. He suggested that the United States establish a foothold in the area, equivalent to the 
British possession of Hong Kong, and he urged that Taiwan (Formosa) be occupied for that 
purpose. (53) He also suggested the United States build coaling stations in the area and expand 
naval operations off the China coast.  
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In the 1850s, China’s new emperor Xianfeng (Hsien-feng) determined on a new 
confrontation with the West, refusing to acknowledge the treaty provisions. Yet the provocative 
policy would not be successful under the international circumstances when the West enjoyed 
more relative power and when the Taiping Rebellion occurred in China, one of the most 
destructive wars in history and its scale even dwarfed that of the American Civil War.  
The Taiping Rebel leader appeared to be the “presumed convert to Christianity.” (54) In 
fact, the rebel leader Hong Xiuquan (Hung Hsiu-chuan) had studied briefly with an American 
missionary Issachar Roberts. The strength of the Taiping movement was readily apparent to the 
West as the Taipings occupied Nanjing, the ancient capital and influenced the lower Yangzi 
(Yangtze) valley and Shanghai area.  
Difficulties with the Chinese government allowed most Westerners to harbor hopes for the 
success of the rebellion. But gradually, they came to believe that the interests of their respective 
countries would not be served by the victory of the rebellious forces. The more they learned of 
the ideology and governmental practices of the Taiping movement, the less attractive it seemed 
to them. The rebellion was hurting trade, the key U.S. goal in China. Humphrey Marshall, the 
American Commissioner from 1852 to 1854, believed that the British government was 
working for the collapse of the Chinese government in order to further British designs. He 
concluded that the Taipings had to be defeated and that the American government had to 
support the emperor and avoid the division of China between Britain and Russia. The Pierce 
administration was not intended to act, for the events in China were far from the focus of 
American government. 
In November 1856, American gunships under Commodore James Armstrong leveled 
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five Chinese forts on the Pearl River near Guangdong. The forts fired on an American vessel 
that passed by and caused the systematic bombardment of retaliation. President Pierce and 
Secretary of State Marcy regretted Armstrong’s harsh response. To the Chinese, who received 
the shots, not the regrets, Armstrong’s action made it hard for them to regard the American 
presence as more beneficent than other Westerners.  
The Buchanan administration replaced Parker with William Reed, the first American 
representative in China with the title of minister. Secretary of State Lewis Cass advised him 
that the United States sought no other purpose than those of lawful commerce, and for the 
protection of the lives and property of its citizens. The reason why American government 
deprived of territorial aggrandizement or the acquisition of political power in China is that 
America was too distant from that region.  
In June 1859, during the process of exchange ratifications of the treaties of Tianjin 
(Tientsin), war occurred between China and the alliance of Britain and France. The Chinese 
defenders fired back and they wounded the British admiral in the ensuring battle. As the fight 
progressed, Commodore Josiah Tatnall, U.S.N, escorting the American minister, was disturbed 
by its course. With the approval of the minister, Josiah Tatnall entered the fray, using a 
chartered steamship to tow British sailing craft into the line of battle. He ordered his crew to 
assist the English gunners, muttering “Blood is thicker than water”. (55) American neutrality 
was compromised.  
     In 1860, British and French forces returned, smashed the Chinese coastal and river 
defenses, and marched overland to Peking. The emperor surrendered his hopes of using 
American barbarians to curb English barbarians and he concluded that the United States was in 
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collusion with China’s enemies. The armies of Great Britain and France marched into Peking 
and into the emperor’s magnificent Summer Palace. They looted and put it to flame, destroying 
the priceless treasures of centuries of Chinese civilization. As a result of the battles of 1859 and 
1860, the British and French heaped further humiliation on China. Tianjin was added to the 
treaty ports. The British took Jiulong (Kowloon) on the mainland across the bay from Hong 
Kong, and the French inserted a clause giving missionaries the right to lease or buy land and to 
build houses anywhere in China, and the West exacted new concessions and privileges. British 
and American merchants continued their involvement in arms trade with the Taiping rebellion, 
yet their small mercenary army, whose first two commanders Ward and Burgemine were 
Americans, was incorporated into the Manchu forces under Li Hongzhang (Li Hung-chang). 
(56)    
In the middle of the nineteenth century, America was in its preindustrial state with its 
vast unoccupied territories and potential domestic market. The center of power rested in 
Europe and the Orient mattered little in the world balance of power. The United States was a 
weak and underdeveloped power. Given its status among the powers, given its limited interests 
in China or elsewhere in the area, the American practice of trailing British power and utilizing 
the most-favored-nation clause furthered these interests. Although this tactic, which several 
historians have labeled “jackal diplomacy,” (57) permitted no claim of moral superiority over 
the procedures employed by the Europeans, it was nonetheless a most realistic and satisfactory 
policy for the United States. Like the lion roars and makes the kill, the jackal smiles and picks 
the bones. And so long as the more powerful predators were willing to tolerate the American 
presence, jackal diplomacy would work.  
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American practices suited well to the interests of the United States and its nationals, it 
cannot be assumed that these practices served the best interests of China. The United States had 
been a junior partner, but it was nonetheless a participant in the events that exploited and 
humiliated China. None of the big powers assumed responsibility for the needs and advantages 
of a colonial-status China.  
     At the time of the Opium War, Chinese officials had hoped that they could count on 
American support, if not loyalty, because of traditional American hostility toward England. 
The Chinese were disappointed, and in subsequent years the Chinese government felt and 
realized that Americans only gave words of sympathy, but never any material support. 
Increasingly, the mandarins who dealt with foreign affairs came to suspect the complicity of the 
United States in England’s schemes. They warned that the Americans always followed in 
England’s wake—allowed British gunboats to humble the Chinese and moved in to share 
whatever new privileges had been exacted. 
When William Seward became the Secretary of State in 1861, his principal task was to 
muster whatever foreign support he could for the Union to prevent the rebellious South from 
receiving any kind of support from abroad. Toward this end, he determined to remove any 
dispute in the relations between the United States and the Powers, especially Great Britain and 
France. In the affairs of Asia and China, America stood shoulder to shoulder with the 
Europeans. Seward sent Anson Burlingame to China, with instructions that made cooperation 
with the powers the official policy of the United States.  
    The death of the emperor in 1861 had left a power vacuum at the court, which the empress 
dowager Cixi (Tz’u Hsi) gradually filled. The new Chinese government began to know more 
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about the Western “law of nations”. The process of westernization had begun and the Chinese 
voluntarily moved away from traditional attitude and method. In 1867, China sent the first 
diplomatic mission, headed by Burlingame, the retiring American minister, to Washington and 
Europe. (58) In the United States, Burlingame exceeded his instructions and signed a treaty with 
Seward in which the United States pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. From 
European countries, he also obtained assurances of future moderation.  
     One provision of the treaty Seward signed with Burlingame gave Chinese immigrants the 
right to enter the United States with the promise of MFN treatment. Seward attempted to treat 
China as an equal among the powers and he also sought to stimulate and regularize the 
immigration of cheap Chinese labors for the rapid development of the West Coast. There were 
100,000 Chinese in America in 1868 and growing numbers of Americans wanted fewer 
Chinese rather than more. The ethnocentrism in America soon turned into racism against the 
Chinese.       
On the West Coast, and particularly in California, violence against the Chinese 
immigrants was rampant. Individual Chinese were subjected to beatings and humiliations, and 
occasionally they were wantonly murdered. In the 1870s and the 1880s, anti-Chinese agitation 
grew more violent, as lynchings, boycotts, and mass expulsions gave witness to racism in 
America, which came to be one of the “darkest chapters in Chinese-American relations.” (59) 
The injustice showed the great discrepancy between the theory and practice of American ideals. 
The pressure to exclude Chinese immigrants forced the Congress to pass a bill in 1879 that 
limited the number of Chinese that could arrive in the United States on one ship. (60) As the bill 
violated American obligations under the Burlingame treaty, President Hayes vetoed it—and 
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was soundly condemned on the Pacific Coast. Congress continued to pass laws violating the 
spirit of the treaty with China. In 1885, twenty-eight Chinese miners were brutally murdered in 
Wyoming and smaller-scale atrocities continued to occur through the American West. The 
immigration issue became a constant irritant in Sino-American relations, with the United States 
acting unilaterally in violation of its treaty obligations.  
     American treatment of Chinese in the United States taught China some interesting lessons. 
The Westerners had come to China in violation of the wishes and occasionally the laws of the 
Chinese people and their government. When these foreigners were treated as barbarians 
contemptuously, the Western powers demanded to be treated as equals with gunboats to impose 
the “superior” values of Western civilization on the unwilling Chinese. The Chinese had been 
taught, with shot and shell, that violations of treaty obligations were not tolerated. China had 
been forced to admit foreigners to its territory and American gunboats to patrol in China, but 
China had no gunboat to send to America. China had no power to protect its people in the 
United States, nor power to force the American government to admit Chinese as equal and 
require the United States to live up to its treaty obligations. 
In 1894, war broke out between China and Japan on the issue of Korea. Within six 
months, the Japanese utterly destroyed China’s fleet and rolled over its armies in Korea and 
Manchuria, astonishing the Chinese and the entire world. In 1895, the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
was signed between the two countries, with “seven new Chinese ports and three rivers opened, 
some internal taxes abolished, and above all, foreigners’ rights to create their own industrial 
enterprises in China were granted.” (61) China was labeled contemptuously as  “dwarf nation” 
and faced the threat of imminent partition. To Japan, victory brought increased prestige and 
55 
great interests. In Washington, the Sino-Japanese War and its outcome were easily accepted. To 
the Cleveland administration, the war did not appear to threaten any American interests. Indeed, 
sentiment in America was pro-Japanese. In part, American sympathies were with Japan 
because of its role in Japan’s opening and the disparity in the size of the combatant countries. 
There were also tremendous feelings of contempt for the Chinese and their apparent 
slothfulness. The Sino-Japanese war was regarded as a contest between barbarism and 
civilization.  
     Soon after the war, European powers like France, Germany, Russia and Britain expanded 
their spheres of influence in China, with mining and railroad development privileges—new 
sorrows for a powerless China—and cause for anxiety among Americans concerned with 
markets and with the balance of power in East Asia.      
By 1899, the United States had become a world power in the sense that it was not only 
the greatest industrial nation, but it was also willing to use its new military power. 
Expansionism and militarism were accepted in America as a national policy, for these theories 
were not peripheral but central to the thinking of some governmental and opinion leaders. 
President McKinley had remained concerned about the events in China even during the War on 
Spain. He insisted that American interests should not be disturbed. There were other currents 
flowing through the United States, ideas about the importance of China in the world balance of 
power and about the importance of the United States in the Far Eastern balance. Brooks Adams 
and Alfred Mahan, generally recognized as the ideologues of American imperialism, both 
placed great stress on the importance of the power struggle in East Asia, and their views were 
often reflected in the writings and speeches of Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. In 
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1899, the acknowledged “old China hand” was William W. Rockhill, an adviser on Far Eastern 
affairs for the Secretary of State John Hay. (62)  
      According to Rockhill, the breakup of China would be a disaster. He was convinced that 
a sovereign China able to preserve order within its own boundaries was essential to the balance 
of power in Asia. On the contrary, the collapse of China would lead to an intensification of the 
imperialist rivalry already begun, even a world war. To prevent catastrophe, he believed the 
United States should use its new position in Asia and its growing influence in the world for the 
preservation of China’s existence as a nation. If necessary, he was willing to have the United 
States declare its intention to assist China in maintaining its territorial integrity. “The policy of 
the government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent 
safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all 
rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the 
world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.” (63) 
Rockhill viewed stability in East Asia as essential to the development of American economic 
interests. Nonetheless, neither McKinley nor Hay was eager to make such a bold policy. 
     Hippisley, an Englishman, worked in the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service. He 
exchanged his ideas with Rockhill of his concern over the scramble for concessions in China 
and drafted a statement that later became John Hay’s “Open Door” notes. Hippisley’s draft 
requested that within the spheres of influence, the powers should not discriminate against the 
trade of other countries nor to interfere with Customs Service. If the imperialist powers 
acquiesced, the goods of all nations would be assured equal treatment in all parts of China. For 
the United States, which had no sphere of its own, such an agreement was of obvious value. 
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The existence of spheres of influence would cease to be a threat to the growing American trade 
with China. Markets would be available to those who sought them, pleasing the American 
Asiatic Association and alleviating concern over economic stagnation. The United States had 
not challenged the existence of spheres of influence, nor had it asked for equal opportunity for 
investment in the various spheres. For all the powers, though there was little to gain from 
agreeing to the American policy declaration, there was also little to lose, so no country was 
willing to reject the American request. Hay’s effort seemed successful and he and McKinley 
announced that American interests in China had been safeguarded.  
Both Hay and Rockhill were convinced that they contributed meaningfully to the 
preservation of the Chinese empire, yet Hay had not consulted with the Chinese government, 
nor sought any expression of China’s needs. The notes were intended to serve the interests of 
the United States, and their value to China was incidental. China showed little gratitude for this, 
and the relations between China and the United States were very tense as a result of American 
discrimination against Chinese immigrants. In the following years, instead of the goodwill that 
Rockhill and Hay had hoped for the United States, they harvested the bitter reward due to 
American racists.      
In the 1890s, the American missionary effort in China had been revitalized after it had 
begun in the 1830s. There is no need to doubt the inherent idealism of the American men and 
women who served the Christian missions in China. They surrendered the comforts to face the 
unknown dangers, perhaps the greatest danger they faced came from the very people to whom 
they hoped to bring salvation. The Chinese had not asked the missionaries to come and the 
Chinese government hoped to forbid the propagation of Christianity in China. Over the years, 
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the Western gunboats had forced China to concede, the missionaries functioned as a part of the 
treaty system, a reminder of China’s humiliations. In China, the faith of the Christian 
missionaries clashed with Chinese culture, and the church sometime disputed with the local 
communities, which inevitably antagonized many Chinese and led to widespread unrest. The 
Boxers, a new movement, was fomented to drive the foreigners out of China.     
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CHAPTER SIX: BALANCE OF POWER TO CONFRONTATION 
(1900-1949) 
 
In June 1900, the German minister was killed by a Chinese soldier and the Chinese court 
declared war on all the powers, with the siege against the Foreign Legations in Beijing, the 
slaughter of missionaries together with thousands of Chinese Christians in North China and 
Manchuria. “The United States moved into the role of direct participant, and American troops 
joined in the expedition to lift the siege of the Legations.” (64) In the besieged quarter sat the 
American minister, E.H. Conger, who months earlier had urged the use of American gunboats, 
insisting that nothing but a show of strength would move the Chinese. And the strength of the 
United States was shown in its troops among the eight countries that had liberated the 
missionaries and diplomats in Peking.  
    The protocol ending the war was signed in September 1901, after a delay occasioned by 
disputes over the size and distribution of the indemnity from China. The powers ultimately 
agreed on an enormous sum, equivalent to more than $300 million, of which the United States 
got $25 million. (65) In addition, foreign troops were allowed to station between Peking and the 
sea. And American naval circles in Washington had been pressing the government to acquire 
territory in China for a coaling station.       
In 1901, following the assassination of McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt became President 
of the United States, and John Hay still dominated the Far Eastern policy until 1904, when the 
Russo-Japanese war began. During these years, American trade declined sharply in China. The 
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balance of power in the area was threatened by Russian adventurism, especially in the 
Manchuria area of China. Sino-American relations in these years were really a three-cornered 
game, with Russia playing the third hand. Following the defeat of the Boxers, the Russians 
intended to control Manchuria completely. Given the limits of American interests in Manchuria, 
Hay and Roosevelt sought merely Russian assurances of fair treatment for American trade. But 
to Japan, Russia’s advances in this area presented a much more tangible threat. Failed the 
alliance with the United States in 1901, Japan soon found an ally with Great Britain in 1902, 
and in February 1904, Japan suddenly attacked the Russian fleet at Port Arthur.  
Roosevelt rejoiced with Japan’s assault on Russian hegemony in Manchuria because of 
his conviction that no damage to American interests would result from a Japanese victory. Yet 
he hoped Russia at least survived as an Asiatic power to be a check on Japan, keeping Japan’s 
attention focused on the mainland instead of looking toward the south like to the Philippines. 
For the following years, the problem how to coexist with Japan troubled those American 
foreign policy makers. “Japan emerged to be one of the first-class military powers of the world,” 
(66) and good relations with Japan had to be central to Roosevelt’s Asian policy. For the United 
States, not any interest in China was worth the risk of antagonizing Japan. (67) Roosevelt’s 
contempt for China came from their failure to defend themselves against imperialism, and he 
assumed that they could never develop a national spirit.  
Changes were taking place in China. The Chinese government had undertaken a series of 
important reforms for gradual modernization and there were manifestations of a rising sense of 
nationalism among the Chinese. Chinese people began to focus their attention on the 
sovereignty and the special privileges the powers had wrested from China. They also became 
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increasingly sensitive and angry with the American Congress for the permanent exclusion of 
Chinese immigrants since 1904, which was a disgrace, a mockery of American ideals and a 
shortcoming of American government. In the late spring of 1905, Chinese merchants and 
students in the major cities launched a boycott of American goods, which “stood as China’s 
first modern demonstration of national resentment against the West.” (68) A number of 
American missionaries were murdered in China. Fearing another Boxer uprising, Roosevelt 
ordered the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet and had the War Department draw up plans for 
possible operations against China. The President knew the cause for such a situation and placed 
responsibility for the difficulties with China on the American people. He insisted in his annual 
message to Congress that grave injustice and wrong had been done by this nation to the people 
of China. He reminded Americans that they had insisted on just treatment by the Chinese, but 
warned that Americans couldn’t receive equity unless they were willing to do the same. 
In 1909, William Howard Taft became President of the United States. His Asian policy 
constituted a sharp departure from past American practices, aggressively promoting the 
economic interests of the United States to an extent never before attempted. As governor of the 
Philippines and during his Asian tour as secretary of war, Taft had become apprehensive about 
Japanese intentions in East Asia. He concluded that Roosevelt’s appeasement of Japan was 
misguided, for Roosevelt subordinated American interests in China to the strong will of Japan. 
Taft personally believed China’s Manchuria being menaced by the railway concessions to 
Japan and Russia, which ought to be stopped, and he desired a “dollar diplomacy” of “share for 
American corporations henceforth in China’s foreign loans and big construction contracts.” (69) 
Taft’s new policy coincided with the views of Philander Knox, his Secretary of State, 
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Huntington Wilson, the first assistant Secretary of State, Willard Straight, the chief of the 
Division of Far Eastern Affairs. All of these men believed that in the pursuit of American 
interests, they were helping China. They assumed the congruity of American and Chinese 
interests. The Taft administration insisted that the “Open Door” policy assured Americans 
equal opportunity for investment throughout China. 
 
Table 1 
Total Investments in China of the Principal Countries in 1902, 1914 and 1931 
                              (Millions of Dollars)                                     
 
1902 1914 1931  1914 1931  02 14 31   02 14 31   02 14 31   02 14 31 
   Great Britain    Japan     Russia  United Sates  France   Germany  
 
                  Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomacy History of the United States, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, INC, New York, 1965, p499. 
 
Financial circles in the United States were generally unenthusiastic about investment 
opportunities in China; they preferred surer profits elsewhere, yet Taft soon found banking 
support for his policy. China hoped to use American support and investment to counter 
Japanese and Russian influences in Manchuria. The Taft administration’s diplomatic offensive 










by Taft’s withholding recognition for the new Chinese republic, when the Chinese people rose 
to rid themselves of both the Manchu dynasty and foreign domination.  
    A successful revolution occurred in China on October 10, 1911, and its acknowledged 
leader Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) was elected Provisional President of the Republic of 
China. Within five months the weak Manchu dynasty was forced to abdicate. Since then, 
“China means to become a nation in the western sense of the word, 
” (70) yet the real power rested with Yuan Shikai (Yuan Shih-k’ai), a general of the former 
government. Without his support, the future of the Republic of China was bleak. In March 1913, 
Yuan had the parliament leader assassinated. At the same time, Woodrow Wilson became 
President of the United States.  
  Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan didn’t trust Roosevelt’s militarism 
and Taft’s dollar diplomacy. Wilson later explained that he felt keenly the desire to help China. 
His administration demonstrated more sympathy to the new Chinese republic government. 
Soon after his inauguration, Wilson advised his cabinet that he had decided to recognize the 
Republic of China on a unilateral basis, and refused to be bound by the decision of other 
governments. Wilson’s cabinet was exhilarated by his high moral purpose, but the other powers 
were not. Japan warned Wilson that the Chinese republic was on the verge of civil war. 
World War I in Europe since 1914 left Japan as China’s principal source of economic 
assistance—and the Japanese didn’t believe a strong China was good for their interests. Each of 
the loans made to China was with an eye toward the enlargement and strengthening of Japan’s 
continental empire. During the war, Japan took over German possessions in East Asia, 
including the German concession in Shandong province (Shantung), China. In January 1915, 
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the Japanese minister to China presented Yuan Shikai with the notorious “Twenty-One 
Demands”, with terms that Japan intended to have China “directly under the control of Tokyo”. 
(71) Clearly, the Japanese recognized the fact that the European War left them with a free hand 
in Asia, and they sought to make the most of the opportunity.  
   Helpless before Japanese pressures, unable to hope for assistance from the European 
powers, the Chinese again turned to the United States. Robert Lansing, then counselor of the 
Department of State, assured sincere American friendship, but for him it would be quixotic that 
the United States be entangled in international difficulties for the issue of China’s territorial 
integrity. In Lansing’s view, American interests in China were commercial only, and a Japanese 
guarantee of equal treatment for American goods satisfied the requirements of the “Open Door” 
policy. But others in the State Department advanced a broader conception of American 
interests in East Asia. E. T. Williams, the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, believed 
that with the modernization of China, the myth of the Chinese market would become reality. He 
argued that despite commercial interests being greater in Japan than in China, a farsighted 
policy would be based on the assumption that American interests would be best served by a 
strong and independent China.  
  In the summer of 1917, a Japanese mission headed by Ishii Kikujiro was sent to 
Washington to negotiate Japan’s special position in China. The discussion between Ishii and 
Secretary of State Lansing indicated little agreement between the two nations. Nonetheless, the 
two diplomats exchanged notes, which couched in the ambiguous language of their profession 
over different views between the two governments. In the notes, Lansing acknowledged that 
Japan’s geographic position allowed it to have “special interests” in China, but in his 
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discussions with Ishii he specially denied that “special” meant “paramount”. (72) To Wilson, 
this agreement was a great stroke on behalf of Chinese as well as American interests, but the 
Chinese were not reassured and full of a mood of despairing.       
   During the Paris Peace Conference began from January 18 to June 28, 1919, the 
overshadowing issues were security for France against future German aggression and the 
League of Nations. On the issue of the Far-East, the American and Chinese delegations worked 
closely together as Wilson hoped to free China from restrictions on her sovereignty. The 
Chinese dreamed of ridding themselves of all the symbols of their semi-colonial status, and 
they were particularly interested in regaining control of Shandong as their minimal demand. 
Japan, however, had signed secret treaties with the European allies that bound them to support 
Japanese claims to the German concessions in China. Under the circumstances, China’s hope 
and Wilson’s efforts on China’s behalf came to nought. When the Japanese threatened to quit 
the Peace Conference, Wilson accepted the Japanese position. To Wilson, Japan was much 
stronger and more important than China, Japan’s quitting meant failure of the League of 
Nations, “Without the League, there could be no hope for an effective collective security 
system. Without collective security, wars would come again.” (73) 
   Wilson’s decision to yield to the Japanese on the Shandong issue proved to be one of the 
most strongly criticized decisions he made at Paris. The Chinese and some of the American 
delegation, including Lansing, were outraged. In China, students went on an extended rampage, 
beginning the May Fourth Movement as a sign of modern China. In the United States, 
opposition to the Shandong decision brought influential liberals to the side of Henry Cabot 
Lodge in opposition to the Treaty of Versailles. The subsequent failure of the United States to 
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join the League postponed the great-power cooperation in China for which Wilson had worked. 
Wilson initiated the “Fourteen Points” in 1918 and the moral standard of “national 
self-determination”, yet he suffered defeat in the presence of the stubbornness of Japanese 
power, and Wilson himself reiterated the importance of power when he later fought for the 
ratification of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles after the Conference. He 
declared that American isolation had ended, not because America chose to go into the politics 
of the world, but because by the sheer genius of this people and the growth of American power. 
In the contest between moral obligation and material interest, Woodrow Wilson saw interest 
usually emerging triumphant. He admitted “We have sympathized with freedom everywhere, 
have pressed handsome principles of equity in international dealings. And yet, when issues of 
our own interest arose, we have not been unselfish. We have shown ourselves kin to all the 
world, when it came to pushing an advantage. ” (74)   
The following Harding administration faced with strong domestic pressures for 
disarmament and the rapid Japanese naval building up. Charles Evans Hughes, the Secretary of 
State realized the arms race could not be isolated from a host of other problems, especially the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, Japanese imperialism in China, and the balance of power in East Asia. 
Thus, it was in response to the American quest for security outside the League of Nations, the 
Washington Conference of 1921-1922 was convened. 
  China was viewed as a potential source of friction among nations, its weakness a 
temptation to adventurism. Ultimately, in the Nine-Power Treaty, the participants in the 
Conference agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of China; to allow the Chinese to solve 
their domestic problems, unify their country and modernize it, in their own way and at their 
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own pace. This was the “internationalization” of the American “Open Door” policy, and the 
Nine-Power Treaty came nowhere near fulfilling the hopes of the Chinese delegates who had 
come to Washington. The first article of the treaty involved four principles that designed to 
freeze rather than to modify the status quo in China. The article required a respect both for 
China’s sovereignty and for those “rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states” that infringe 
that sovereignty. (75) 
    From 1922 to 1925, Jacob Gould Schurman, President Harding’s minister to China, and 
J.V.A. MacMurray, Hughes’ principal advisor and “America’s gunboat minister,” (76) had 
control over American policy toward China. They agreed that concessions to China, especially 
the abolition of extraterritoriality, would have to await order in China. Attributing China’s new 
burst of nationalism to Soviet agitation, they described the Chinese as having become very 
self-assertive, and their response became inadequate. A combination of sterile legalism and a 
rigid insistence on order shaped American policy during that time. 
    With Frank Kellogg becoming the new Secretary of State, he decided to yield to the 
Chinese demands for treaty revision. He was deeply influenced by the views of Nelson Johnson, 
his principal advisor on Chinese affairs. (77) Johnson had concluded that revolution and its 
accompanying violence and disorder were necessary before the Chinese could slough off the 
moribund civilization that thwarted their development. In the process, Kellogg and Johnson 
were determined to retain what they believed to be America’s image as China’s leading friend. 
Concerned about Soviet imperialism, they concluded that the success of the Chinese 
nationalists would be the best defense against that threat. They fortified the view of the Chinese 
revolution as a worthy imitator of the American Revolution—the independence and freedom to 
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determine their own future. And if the United States remained friendly to China, the Chinese 
nationalists could only reciprocate this friendship. In short, this policy was congruent not only 
with American ideals but with American interests as well.  
    In July 1928, America and China signed a new tariff treaty, granting tariff autonomy to 
China and containing a mutual guarantee of MFN treatment. (78) Constituting recognition of 
Jiang Jieshi (Chiang kai-shek)’s national government of China, the signing of the treaty 
symbolized the successful conclusion of Kellogg’s quest to establish America as China’s 
principal friend. In 1928, it was clear that Americans had reason to be satisfied with their 
government’s policy. The influences of the Soviet Union, the nation that had aided the 
Guomindang (Kuomintang, the Nationalist Party), manipulated the Chinese Communist Party, 
had been exclude totally from China. Japanese meddling won few friends in Chinese 
government. American policy had facilitated a rapprochement with Nationalist China. Once 
again, Americans could view themselves as champions of the sovereign rights of China.  
Throughout the 1920s, China witnessed civil strife and great upheavals. The 
nationalists under Sun Zhongshan and then under Jiang Jieshi, resumed plans for the military 
reunification of the country. The Chinese Communist Party was formally established with the 
help of the Soviet Union. The warlords in both South and North China continued to fight for 
their own powers. With Jiang gradually defeated all other opponents and took the upper hand, 
he and his followers formed the national government of China in Nanjing on October 10, 1928. 
Yet at the same time, Japan attempted military conquest of China.  
    When the Japanese army attacked Manchuria in September 1931 and “inaugurated the 
Far Eastern crisis,” (79) Jiang appealed to the League of Nations. Unfortunately for China, the 
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autumn of 1931 proved to be a poor time to attract support, for Europe had suffered 
grievously by the Great Depression. In the United States, the search for an escape from 
economic stagnation and collection of war debts fully occupied the administration of Herbert 
Hoover and the Secretary of State, Henry Stimson. Besides, America had grown accustomed 
to living with the Japanese domination in Manchuria. Leading American diplomats, like 
Nelson Johnson and Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern affairs, who 
were long reputed to be pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese, were prepared to accept the reality. 
These men recognized the fact of Japan’s vital interest in the area and the absence of any 
significant American interest. In 1931, the American minister to China, Nelson Johnson 
wrote that “if Manchuria is destined to become part of Japan, I do not see why that should 
necessarily embroil us.” (80)  
    As the Japanese army rolled on, Secretary of War Patrick Hurley concluded that the 
American army and navy were unprepared and not strong enough to fight. And the President 
was resolutely opposed to the use of force, even the use of economic sanctions. Given this 
complex of circumstances and attitudes, a decision to appease Japan seemed obvious. In 
January 1932, Stimson informed both China and Japan that the United States would recognize 
no impairment of its treaty rights. Yet, Japanese army created a puppet state of “Manzhou Guo 
(Manchukuo)” in February 1932, totally under Japanese tutelage. (81)    
In November 1932, the American people chose a new President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Initially Roosevelt followed a course of returning to Theodore’s policy of appeasing Japan. The 
American public expressed the regret at seeing China under Japanese control, yet they insisted 
if China lacked the strength to protect herself from aggression, she could not reasonably expect 
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other nations to do the job for her. “Certainly America is not going to court trouble by any 
quixotic attempt to checkmate Japan in Asia.” (82)  
   Throughout 1935 and 1936, Japanese encroachments on China continued, but American 
policy remained basically appeasement to Japan. As to the growing Chinese dissatisfaction and 
complaints with the United States, Johnson and Hornbeck often stated that American policy 
was supposed to serve American ends first. They were quick to counter the suggestions that the 
United States fight China’s battles. In July 1937, as the fighting in China intensified and 
developed into a major war, the American response remained unchanged. Hornbeck made 
essentially the same points, declaring that the United States had always favored a strong and 
united China, but that American policy was designed to do more than merely help China. He 
claimed for the United States the privilege of acting on its own conception of national interest. 
“America’s decision to isolate itself from China’s misfortunes was neither totally selfish nor 
difficult to understand. It seemed sheer folly to risk war with Japan, and China’s confused 
political situation made it even more difficult for Washington to consider any form of 
intervention.” (83) 
  Throughout the 1930s, events in Asia concerned Roosevelt little more than that of the 
American domestic priorities. Despites his frequently voiced affection for China, he was 
largely indifferent to her fate, deeming American interests there to be slight, unwilling to 
concede that Japanese hegemony over China would threaten the United States. And American 
power then was insufficient to challenge Japanese predominance in East Asia. In a speech in 
October, 1937, Roosevelt called vaguely for “quarantine” on aggressors to check the “epidemic 
of world lawlessness.” (84)After the speech, the President admitted he had no plan, but 
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American isolationists responded to the speech by warning him against any bold action. In 
Washington, there arose a conviction that so long as the Japanese were drawn deeper and 
deeper into China, they would trouble no one else. This conviction continued until Japanese 
attack on the Pearl Harbor. In the defense of the interests of the United States, it was important 
to give the Chinese enough aid to keep them fighting, but it was not necessary to give them 
enough to win. And if China would not fight, Asian affairs could await the settlement of vital 
issues across the Atlantic. The fight to liberate China was not an important American priority, 
merely a sideshow in the war against the Axis.  
    
Table 2  
American Exports to China and Japan, 1932-1940 
_______________________________________________________ 
             Value of Exports             Percentage of Total 
                (in $ millions)               U.S. Export Trade 
Year       To China   To Japan           To China   To Japan_________ 
1932         56       135                3.5        8.4 
1933         52       143                3.1        8.5 
1934         69       210                3.2        9.9 
1935         38       203                1.7        8.9 
1936         47       204                1.9        8.3 
1937         50       289                1.5        8.6 
1938         35       240                1.3        7.8 
1939         56       232                1.8        7.3 
1940         78       227                1.9   ___  5.6____________ 
                                Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to  
China,Columbia University Press, New York,1990, p123. 
 
Roosevelt refused to apply the Neutrality Act to the “incident” in China, thus making it 
legal to sell arms and munitions to Jiang’s government, yet it could not obscure the 
preponderance of American trade with Japan. “As late as 1940, $78 million in American 
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exports went to China, whereas $227 million were shipped to Japan, and oil, the most vital 
ingredients in Japan’s war machine, was not withheld until July, 1941.” (85) Just before the 
Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor, the United States gradually tightened the screws on 
Japan—not out of sudden concern for China, but because of the threat posed by Japan’s 
southward thrusts and ultimately by its adherence to the Rome-Berlin Axis. Thus China was 
transformed into an American ally. America renounced the last privilege under the “unequal 
treaties”—at least in theory, and talked much of China as a great power after the war.      
   In February 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met at Yalta, negotiating the subjects 
of United Nations, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Poland, Germany, the Far East and the 
Pacific War. In the Far East, the Soviet Union intended to regain everything the Tsars had lost 
or traded to the Japanese—the Kurile Islands, Southern Sakhalin, control of the Manchurian 
railways. America hoped to expel the “imperialists”—Britain, France, and Japan—from China 
and Korea, and possibly from Indochina and Hong Kong, and to substitute American economic 
hegemony. As to the influence of sphere, Stalin and Churchill regarded China, “the sleeping 
giant of Asia as America’s baby.” (86) “Believing that an invasion of Japan’s home islands 
would be necessary to unconditionally defeat Japan and always eager to minimize American 
casualties, Roosevelt saw the benefits of a Soviet attack on Japan’s army in Manchuria, China.” 
(87) The details of the Far East settlement were worked out on the last day of the Conference, at 
a meeting between Harriman and Molotov, the representatives of the American and Soviet 
delegations. Specifically, the draft agreement mentioned that in two or three months after 
Germany had surrendered, the Soviet Union would enter into the war against Japan on the side 
of the Allies on condition that “the status quo in Outer-Mongolia should be preserved, the 
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former rights of Russia in Port of Dairen and Port of Arthur, the Russian rights to operate the 
China-Eastern and Southern-Manchuria railroads should be restored.” (88)At Yalta, Roosevelt 
undertook to dispose of Chinese territory without China’s prior consent, which was consistent 
with traditional American indifference as to the real Chinese interests. Once again, the 
Roosevelt years demonstrated that American policy was designed to serve American interests 
without particular regard to China. At the end of World War II, Roosevelt nominated China as a 
great power and one of the five members of the United Nations Security Council, more or less 
for the compensation to the past wartime neglect. Had Roosevelt reviewed his administration’s 
policies toward China, he would have realized how absurd were American pretensions to the 
role of China’s champion of interest preserver. The undeniable fact is that China benefited 
incidentally and when the interests of the two countries could coincide. Roosevelt’s East Asian 
policies gave Americans no cause for grievance—and the Chinese no cause for gratitude.     
In the year 1945 the United States defeated the Japanese Empire and became the 
dominant military power in the Pacific and in the world. The Truman administration hoped 
China could police its East Asia affairs and be part of the global containment strategy against 
the Soviet Union. (89) America began to negotiate a new treaty with the Chinese Nationalist 
government. Conflicting visions and policy differences were manifested on the issues of the 
post-war China economic model, American most-favored-nation status or national treatment, 
time limit conditional or unconditional, etc. The American negotiators recommended using a 
U.S. government loan as a bargaining chip to bring the Chinese Nationalist government to 
terms and finally on November 8, 1946, the treaty was signed.  
Soon after the signing of the treaty, a stunned American Embassy in China reported that 
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the treaty was received with reservations or even an attitude of hostility. Most Chinese 
newspaper editorials, articles and public opinions were overwhelmingly against the treaty. In 
February 1947, when an American professor visited China, he was surprised to find how many 
businessmen and financiers, along with intellectuals in China, believed that the Nationalist 
government was beyond any hope. Even some British observers described the treaty as “an act 
of economic aggression, unprecedented and most savage.” (90) The signing of the treaty 
became the occasion for a communist-declared National Humiliation Day. By November the 
communists were claiming that Jiang had turned the economic, political, and military control 
of China over to the United States.  
      “Truman was the first U.S. President to stress the useful role China could play in the 
adversarial post-war dynamic to help protect U.S. interests,” (91) yet the Truman administration 
fundamentally misjudged China’s economic conditions and aspirations, for Washington’s 
economic reconstruction plans for Nationalist China was based on the American-Soviet rivalry, 
rather in the context of China’s historical quest for modernity and new identity. The Chinese 
economy worsened rapidly in the aftermath of signing the treaty, until the Nationalist was 
finally defeated by the communists in 1949.  
     In November, 1945, President Truman appointed General George C. Marshall as his 
special representative in China to continue the work of mediation between the nationalists and 
the communists, which had previously begun by Hurley since 1944. (92) On December 15, 
1945, Marshall arrived in China and began his mediation between the Nationalists (KMT) and 
the Communists (CCP). When he arrived, the KMT-CCP negotiations had just reached an 
impasse. Urban Chinese, particularly the Third Force, were overjoyed by his arrival. On 
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January 10, 1946, with Marshall’s effective mediation, the Chinese Political Consultative 
Conference (PCC), convened in Chongqing (Chungking) and soon passed a resolution 
declaring that a democratic coalition government including the KMT, the CCP, and the Third 
Force. The armed forces would be nationalized and the National Assembly established. Yet, the 
resolution triggered an angry uproar within the conservative factions of the Nationalists. For 
them, it was like a coup against the party or criminal behavior. (93)  
With the Soviet military withdrawal from Manchuria, the Nationalists immediately took 
over the key cities and ports. The eruption of the civil war in Manchuria put Marshall in a 
political dilemma. On June 10, 1946, Jiang publicly changed his position and pledged to solve 
the communist issue through military means in one year. On June 26, 1946, in Washington, the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee reported favorably on the military assistance bill to the 
Nationalists’ government. One day later, the Truman administration announced that the United 
States was to provide the KMT government with $51.7 million equipment. Very soon, Marshall 
reported to Truman that it would be impossible for him to continue his mediation in China. (94)  
     By mid-1946, the communists were in great disadvantage compared with the Nationalists 
military forces. America intervened in the Chinese civil war and stood on the side of Jiang. The 
American military came up with detailed plans for training ten Nationalist divisions and 
air-lifted Nationalists’ soldiers to the fronts during late 1945 and early 1946, allowing them to 
take control of key cities and positions in China’s heartland. American involvement into 
Chinese Civil War not only alienated the communists, but also strengthened Jiang’s 
intransigence against any compromise.  
Jiang lost most of his best troops in 1948 and in 1949. On April 23, 1949, the 
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Nationalist government evacuated from Nanjing and then moved to Taiwan. The People’s 
Republic of China was founded on October 1, 1949. During the dramatic and drastic change, 
U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart delayed his departure from China, waiting to get the 
chance to discuss possible diplomatic relations with the new government.  
The discussions between Stuart and Huang Hua, the communist representative in 
Nanjing resulted in an invitation to Stuart to visit Beijing in July, 1949 for an informal meeting 
with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. (95) John M. Cabot, Consul General in Shanghai pointed out 
that a meeting between Mao and the American ambassador would have been welcomed by 
American businessmen and employers, yet Washington rejected the invitation, which was 
viewed as a confirmation of American hostility to the new government. At the very least, the 
U.S. lost a chance for an earnest Sino-American dialogue. On July 1, 1949, Mao declared that 
China would lean to the side of the Soviet Union in international affairs. (96) In February 1950, 
the two communist countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Help.  
    While “waiting for the dust to settle” during the summer of 1949, Dean G. Acheson, 
Secretary of State decided to release the facts and American policy about China. Believing that 
the “human mind could be moved by facts and reason,” (97) Acheson had the State Department 
prepare a thorough study of the recent Sino-American relationship, which he hoped, would 
dispel some of the misrepresentations. This government document carried the imposing title 
United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, 
commonly known as the China White Paper. (98)  
     The 1,054-page report issued on August 6, 1949 placed the entire blame for the loss of 
China on the Nationalist government, and portrayed Jiang and his government as corrupt and 
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incompetent. The China White Paper summarized that “The reasons for the failure of the 
Chinese National Government---do not stem from any inadequacy of American aid. Our 
military observers on the spot have reported that the Nationalist armies did not lose a single 
battle during the crucial year of 1948 through lack of arms or ammunition. Nationalist China 
received in the form of grants and credits approximately two billion dollars---and large 
quantities of military and civilian war surplus property with a total procurement cost of over 
one billion dollars.” (99) 
     Acheson concluded that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the 
control of the government of the United States. Nothing that America did or could have done 
within the reasonable limits would have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by 
America has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces that America tried 
to influence but failed.  
     The United States insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the Nationalist 
government at Taiwan and imposed economic sanctions on the new communist regime, Beijing 
chose to respond in kind. It took several hostile steps toward the United States in 1949-1950, 
including the detention of Angus Ward, the American consul in Shenyang, on espionage 
charges, the seizure of the American military barracks in Beijing, the harassment of U.S. 
diplomats seeking to leave China, and the arrest of American missionaries working in the 
country. Some Americans, and even a few Chinese, have argued that there was a “lost chance” 
in 1949—that greater flexibility on the American side could have avoided a hostile relationship 
between the new People’s Republic and the United States.    
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FROM ENEMIES TO COMPETITORS 
(1950-2009) 
In late 1949, when the CIA warned that the Chinese communists were planning to launch 
their military campaign against Taiwan in the summer of 1950, and when the Pentagon 
reported that America’s military force was not yet ready to defend the island, the State 
Department faced a dilemma: if the CCP’s Taiwan campaign were to take place the following 
summer, what would be the United States’ policy toward Taiwan? Should the United States try 
to deter the CCP by threatening military intervention, as recommended by the Pentagon? Or 
should the United States seize this opportunity to send a message to the Chinese Communists 
that the United States would not intervene in their Taiwan campaign, thereby undermining the 
ongoing Sino-Soviet alliance treaty negotiation in Moscow, as recommended by the Division 
of Chinese Affairs? Of the two positions, Acheson believed that the latter was far better than 
the former. Thus America’s military withdrawal from Taiwan, he asserted, could effectively 
and powerfully isolated the Soviet Union as the only nation that was seeking territorial 
aggrandizement in Asia.  
     Truman agreed with Acheson’s recommendation. On January 5, 1950, he issued an 
official statement on America policy toward Taiwan. He declared that America’s traditional 
China policy, or the “Open Door” policy, “called for international respect for the territorial 
integrity of China.” Then, he emphasized that Taiwan’s legal status was part of China. (100) 
     Despite their opposing ideological rhetoric, the State Department’s China policy and 
Beijing’s America policy from 1949 to mid-1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, bore 
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amazing similarities. The first, neither side attempted to establish a diplomatic relationship 
with the other in the short run; the second, neither side formulated a confrontational policy 
against the other; the third, and most important, both sides intended to build a limited working 
relationship, starting in the economic arena. 
 These policy similarities can be attributed to both sides’ overriding objective: splitting 
the other’s strategic partnership. Washington’s goal was to break up the Sino-Soviet coalition, 
and Beijing’s was to weaken the Washing-Jiang alliance. A war with Beijing, from Dean 
Acheson’s viewpoint, could only drive China into the arms of the Soviet Union. A war with 
Washington, from Mao’s perspective, could only compel Washington to rescue the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan.   
     The Korean War ended any hope that the passage of time would allow the dust to settle. 
Although the outbreak of armed conflict on the peninsula in June 1950 was not the result of 
decisions made in either Beijing or Washington, Sino-American relations were still one of the 
war’s principal victims. Acting as the instrument of the United Nations, Americans forces 
came to the aid of the disintegrating South Korean Army, and with the help of units from a 
dozen other U.N. members, they held the Pusan perimeter. In September, General MacArthur 
launched a brilliant amphibious operation at Inchon, and by the end of the month, American 
forces were in virtual control of South Korea. Then the United States broadened its objectives 
to include the liberation of North Korea and cross over the 38th parallel. MacArthur hoped to 
end the war before Thanksgiving and the soldiers could be home before Christmas. All 
members of Truman’s advisory group regarded China as a weak nation, whose main source of 
potency in world affairs came from its affiliation with the Soviet Union. This unrealistic image 
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was based on the ideological presuppositions that were popular then in the United States. The 
government’s miscalculation failed to take account of Red China’s possible responses to 
American troops in Korea, to America’s military power to gain control over China’s neighbor 
and ally. (101) The prospect of a pro-American, non-communist regime on China’s northeastern 
frontier was unacceptable to Chinese leaders, who viewed the American decision as a 
harbinger of a much broader effort to overthrow the new communist government in China.  
 Beijing therefore threatened to intervene if American forces approached China’s border. 
Washington ignored the warnings by misreading China’s intentions and capabilities, so Mao 
decided to intervene in force, despite the reservations of his military and civilian lieutenants 
and the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to provide direct military support. “By November 
1950, a half million Chinese and American troops were locked in a brutal war that lasted until 
mid-1953.”(102)The result was about 150, 000 Chinese, and approximately 50,000 Americans 
lost their lives. Chinese intervention in Korea hardened American opposition to Beijing and 
widened the circle of Americans who sought Jiang’s return to power.  
 The Korean War made China and America enemies, the road to recognition was 
impassable. The war deepened and institutionalized the confrontation between China and the 
United States. With the outbreak of the conflict, Washington imposed even tougher sanctions 
against Beijing. In addition, the Korean War also occasioned a very significant change in 
American policy toward Taiwan. With American Seventh Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait, the 
military assistance to Jiang was resumed. In 1954, America signed a mutual defense treaty with 
the Nationalist government in Taiwan. At the same time, in order to deny the communist 
government in Beijing any claim to sovereignty over the island, the United States also adopted 
81 
the position that the legal status of Taiwan was undetermined. “Supporting Taiwan became the 
single most way of containing China and integrating other Asian countries, economically and 
militarily, into an American security system in Asia. After the outbreak of the Korean War, 
isolating China and remaking Asia diplomatically and ideologically became inseparable goals” 
(103)  
On February 9, 1950, Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy from Wisconsin 
delivered a speech to a small Republican gathering in Wheeling, West Virginia. He assaulted 
that two hundred and five communists, i.e., traitors, had infiltrated the State Department, which 
was part of an international conspiracy that had delivered China to communist rule, Eastern 
Europe to the Soviet Union and more betrayals. (104)With breathtaking audacity, McCarthy 
offered no proof but more accusation by names. The State Department specialists on China, 
like Edmund Clubb, John Paton Davis, John Stewart Service, and John Carter Vincent, were 
abused and persecuted. During the McCarthy era, lots of people were suspected as spies of the 
Soviet Union and China, and the work of Department of State was severely damaged. 
McCarthyism was one of the most shameful and destructive episodes in the history of the 
United States. It looked preposterous but not accidental, it was a manifestation of the rage 
which the American leaders, because of their embarrassment and shame, felt more intensely 
when the Chinese people liberated themselves from imperialism, which the Americans never 
believed or expected. From 1954, McCarthy began to be disgraced and soon forgotten after his 
death. It is as though Americans had become ashamed of themselves for having permitted such 
a man to speak for them, to exploit their credulity in their moment of vulnerability. 
McCarthyism was defined in the Webster’s Dictionary in 1961 as “political attitude of the 
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mid-twentieth century closely allied to know-nothingism and characterized chiefly by the 
opposition to elements held to be subversive and by the use of tactics involving personal 
attacks on individuals by means of widely publicized indiscriminate allegations, esp. on the 
basis of unsubstantiated charges.” (105)  
The 1950s witnessed the further hardening of anti-Chinese attitudes and policy. The 
Eisenhower administration tolerated and abetted the McCarthyite emasculation of the 
Department of State, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles convinced himself of the 
immorality of communists, particularly the Chinese communists. He pledged to end the neglect 
of the Far East, and tried to isolate, encircle and overthrow the Beijing government. The United 
States would recognize only the Republic of China in Taiwan, and would not tolerate the 
seating of Beijing in the United Nations. In August 1958, America helped Jiang move one 
hundred thousand of troops onto the offshore islands of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu), 
where the Nationalist army had been bombarding the mainland China. Beijing resumed 
harassing the shipping and shelling the offshore islands and America threatened to defend and 
retaliate with nuclear weapons.    
  In 1961, John F. Kennedy took the reins of the American government, determined to 
reduce the tensions of the Cold war. However, despite considerable success in the policy 
toward Eastern Europe, Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk concluded that China had 
become the more dangerous of the two leading communist states. Though some obvious 
disagreements over the key issues like ideology and strategy had emerged between China and 
the Soviet Union, the Kennedy administration didn’t intend to exploit it. Regrettably, the 
Johnson administration perpetuated Kennedy’s decision to draw the line in Vietnam. In the 
83 
mid-1960s more and more of American vast resources were poured into Vietnam, with 
disastrous effects on the people of that hapless country and little benefit to anyone.  
At the same time, the relations between China and the Soviet Union are undertaking 
dramatic changes. Since Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao was less willing to obey Soviet leadership. 
In Moscow, Nikita Khrushchev was not ready for confrontation with America, despite of all his 
rhetoric of bellicosity. During the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958, Khrushchev advised China to 
accept the two-China policy that America liked to offer, rather than support Beijing’s 
determination to liberate Taiwan. The Chinese were outraged and their hostility to the Soviet 
leader was apparent to Western observers by 1959. Angered by Chinese criticism, Khrushchev 
recalled Soviet aid missions from China. By 1960, the Chinese communists had begun to 
carefully document the differences between the two countries. “In substance, Beijing argued 
that there should be peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, but that 
the international class war between oppressors and the oppressed should continue unabated.” 
(106)More ominous than these polemics were the growing boundary disputes and conflicts 
between China and the Soviet. In March 1969, Sino-Soviet tensions erupted in two serious 
border clashes that resulted in heavy casualties. (107) China became a nuclear power in 1964, 
and the prospect of nuclear war was frightening to the world.  
When Richard Nixon came to be President, he and his National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger seemed to understand the changed mood of the American people and their 
conciliatory attitude towards China. Improvement with Beijing was essential to the change of 
balance in international relations and to the negotiation of ending the Vietnam War. Since July 
1969, travel and trade restrictions after the Korean War were eased, the patrols of the Seventh 
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Fleet in the Taiwan Straits stopped. Early in 1970, Sino-American ambassadorial-level 
conversations began anew. Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and then 
a public one in October to “reestablish direct communication and decided on a Presidential trip 
to China.” (108)  
  Mao and Nixon, the two leaders of China and America, both had international reputations 
as committed opponents of each other’s political philosophy, found that their ideological 
differences would have little relevance to the conduct of their relationship. Mao and Nixon 
were decision-makers of realpolitik and wanted to engage in the areas of their common interest, 
the apprehension about the Soviet Union. Under Leonid Brezhnev, Moscow undertook a 
sustained expansion of its military power, conventional and nuclear, much of which deployed 
along the Sino-Soviet frontier. At the same time, the Soviet Union was clearly gaining 
advantage in the global balance against the United States that being tangled in the Vietnam War. 
The war cost America “more than $150 billion, the loss of more than 58,000 lives, yet the 
world’s most powerful nation failed to achieve its objectives and suffered its first defeat in war, 
a humiliating and deeply frustrating experience for a people accustomed to success.” (109) In 
the aftermath, “the Americans, for their part, hoped for a major realignment in the balance of 
power that would give them China, with its massive population, huge territories, and enormous 
potential, as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union and also as a new means of pressuring 
North Vietnam.” (110) 
  Such circumstances provided a compelling motive for a rapprochement between the 
United States and China. At a maximum, the two countries could find ways of coordinating in a 
united front against Soviet expansion. At a minimum, ending the Sino-American confrontation 
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would mean the Kremlin would face a possible two-front war. “Thus, simply by shaking hands 
at the Beijing airport, Zhou Enlai and Richard Nixon had fundamentally altered the contours of 
global geopolitics.” (111)  
Besides, Chinese leaders were more and more interested in resuming economic and 
cultural ties with the United States. An improved relationship with the United States would be 
an important part for China’s economic modernization. Many in the United States were also 
aware of the advantages of renewing cultural and economic ties with China. American business 
would benefit from regaining access to a big market. For Henry Kissinger and Nixon, these 
considerations would help gain domestic support for the reorientation of American China 
policy that they envisioned.    
 On February 28, 1972, the last day of Nixon’s visit to China, the two governments 
declared the Shanghai Communique, (112) identifying the common interests of the two 
countries as opposing Soviet expansion in Asia, reducing the prospects of bilateral military 
confrontation, and expanding Sino-American economic and cultural relations. On the issue of 
Taiwan, both sides made significant concessions, proclaiming the “One China policy” and 
Taiwan is a part of China. The United States would not support a Taiwan independence 
movement, and Nixon would seek Sino-American normalization.    
Domestic problems in both the United States and China precluded decisive action in 
either country from 1973 to 1977. By the end of 1976, the patterns of new leadership in both 
countries were clear. In China, the government was in the hands of men committed to an 
improvement of relations with the West in general—and the United States in particular. In the 
United States, the election of 1976 brought Jimmy Carter into White House.  
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  A Gallup poll in mid-1977 indicated popular resistance to the “abandonment” of Taiwan. 
It seemed clear that Carter had no sense of urgency, no appreciation of opportunities lost in the 
past, for his administration was dominated by the issue of the superpower nuclear stand-off. 
(113) In the spring of 1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor persuaded the 
President to press for “normalization”, though Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State argued 
China was not a major strategic power. In June 1978, Leonard Woodcock, the labor leader who 
was heading the liaison office in Beijing, was instructed to present American terms for 
normalization. (114)After arduous negotiations, Deng Xiaoping and Woodcock reached 
agreement on December 13. The public responded favorably to the President’s announcement 
of his intention to establish normal diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China 
from January 1, 1979.   
 In March, 1979, American Congress ratified the Taiwan Relations Act by the margin 
339-50 in the House and 85-4 in the Senate. (115)The main contents included amendment that 
would upgrade future American relations with Taiwan and more explicit American 
commitment to Taiwan security. The United States still placed under its protection not only 
Taiwan’s security but also its social and economic system. 
 Anyway, normalization enabled rapid and dramatic growth in the economic and cultural 
ties between China and the United States. During Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Washington in 1979, 
the two countries signed a further accord on scientific and technological cooperation. Under 
that agreement, about fourteen programs were approved by the end of 1980. And the Carter 
administration decided in mid-1980 to sign a trade agreement with Peking that would extend 
most-favored –nation treatment to China.  
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  During the Presidential race of 1980, Ronald Reagan declared his desire to restore some 
official relations with Taiwan and increase arms sales to defense the island. Fortunately, China 
and America tried to prevent a serious rupture of the relationship. On August 17, 1982, the two 
countries reached an understanding on the parameters of American arms sales to Taiwan, it 
“will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms, the level since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, and to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period 
of time to final resolution.” (116) The United States announced a further relaxation of its 
restrictions on the transfer of advanced technology to China.  
The intensification of Chinese political and economic reform beginning in 1984-85 
inaugurated yet another cycle in the contemporary Sino-American relationship. A more open 
China greatly facilitated the quantitative and qualitative expansion of the relations between the 
two countries. Some Americans were convinced that China was on the verge of capitalism and 
perhaps even democracy. Despite differences over human rights, commercial relations, and 
China’s arms sales abroad, the mutual perception of a more stable and mature relationship 
between China and the United States lasted until June 1989.    
The incident in Tiananmen Square sparked the most severe crisis in U.S. relations with 
China since the rapprochement in 1972. As the demonstration in Beijing mounted in late April 
and early May, the Bush administration struggled to find an appropriate American response. 
The crackdown in Tiananmen Square on June 4th forced America to take bolder action. The 
White House immediately issued a statement saying the president “deeply deplored the 
decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators.” (117) Horrified at the signs of 
repression in Beijing, and dismayed at the seeming reversal of political and economic reform, 
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Americans demanded that their government impose diplomatic and economic sanctions 
against China. Chinese leaders, angered at the intervention in their internal affairs, responded 
with countersanctions. As a result, U.S-China relations suffered on almost every front from 
trade, investment and official contact.  
  The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident revealed the roles that ideology and human rights 
played in Sino-American relations. Ideological considerations have been a constant source of 
ambivalence and opposition to the two countries since 1950s. These considerations obstructed 
the moderation of each country’s policy toward the other. Development in the late 1980s, 
however, led to a resurgence of the ideological factor in the relationship. Chinese conservatives 
saw the growing American economic and cultural presence in China as a dangerous 
intervention in their internal affair. For American society, the 1989 Tiananmen incident was 
viewed as the accumulation of Chinese government’s repression of the democracy movement 
and human rights. During the crisis of 1989, U.S. relations with China were severely weakened 
and human rights emerged as a critical and constant issue between the two countries.     
  “The story of how human rights became an integral and legitimate part of foreign policy 
and international relations illuminates the power of principled ideas to shape policy.” (118) 
Human rights ideas entered foreign policy debates in the United States after World War II. Yet 
for America, human rights was an external issue, one easily subsumed by and subordinated to 
the Cold War, which had emerged at the top of the foreign policy agenda, human rights policies 
virtually disappeared in American foreign policy for twenty years from the 1950s to the 1970s.  
The emergence of human rights policy is not a simply victory of ideas over interests. 
Rather, it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape the understanding and perception of 
89 
national interests, especially long-term national interests. China’s human’s rights situation was 
first reported only in 1978 by Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch’s Asia division 
was not founded until 1985. In the early 1980s, American government and experts were still 
discussing whether this issue was legitimate or not in making foreign policy and how to 
effectively promote human rights without sacrificing other interests.    
    Human-rights policy, it was argued, would be useful in a number of ways. One was that the 
policy would strengthen domestic support for government actions abroad. Second, advocacy of 
human rights would also appeal to popular opinion abroad and improve Washington’s 
international image. Finally, “there are some conservative human-rights     activists who feel 
that this theme can be exploited for purposes of anti-communist and anti-totalitarian 
propaganda.” (119)  
In 1992, when Bill Clinton ran for the presidency, he proclaimed “he would stand up to 
the tyrants in Beijing and promote democracy.” (120)Indeed, the Democratic Congress 
challenged the Bush administration over its granting of the MFN status to China due to the 
Tiananmen crisis and nearly passed a resolution overriding a presidential veto on at least one 
occasion. In a quick policy reversal shortly after his election in November 1992, Clinton 
announced that he would continue the past Bush policy. In May 1993, he granted China 
provisional renewal of MFN status, but he required that China make real progress in the 
human-rights area for subsequent renewals. In May 1994, however, the Clinton administration 
not only decided to renew MFN to China, but the administration delinked future renewals from 
human-rights considerations in his “broader engagement” strategy. (121) Since then, the Clinton 
administration routinely renewed MFN, arguing that a free trading relationship with China is 
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the most practical way to promote long-term political change to democracy. 
In 1995 and in 1996, during the election season in Taiwan, China roiled the waters of the 
Taiwan Strait by testing three ballistic missiles in the areas around Taiwan to demonstrate its 
will to prevent Taiwanese independence. Since President Carter normalized relations with 
mainland China, America kept good relations with Taiwan. Taiwan has moved from 
dictatorship to democracy and Taiwanese business invested heavily in the mainland. Beijing 
likes the Taiwanese investment, but cannot compromise upon its sovereignty over the island. It 
is a constant challenge for China’s leaders to find the right balance between economic 
pragmatism and national unification. In response to this missile crisis, the Clinton 
administration sent a carrier group from the Pacific fleet into the Taiwan Strait, signaling its 
determination to prevent the use of force against Taiwan, as Clinton proclaimed “We had never 
said whether we would or wouldn’t come to the defense of Taiwan if it were attacked.” (122) 
Another setback followed when American cruise missiles struck the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade during the Kosovo War in 1999, which was widely regarded in China as an 
intentional act of war.  
When George W. Bush came to be President in 2000, a rising China was regarded as one 
of the three vital threats to American security, besides Bin Laden terrorists and the weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD). (123) After the 9/11 attack, Bush administration began to seek more 
help and cooperation from China on the issues of counter-terrorism, Non-proliferation, the 
reconstruction of Iraq, and the maintenance of stability in the Middle East. More and more, 
Washington has also started to seek China’s cooperation in fields such as trade and finance, 
despite increased friction over currency exchange rates, intellectual property rights, and the 
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textile trade.  
  During Bush administration, neo-conservatives (neocons) were more influential in the 
academy and government. Neocons foreign policies include unilateralism, militarism and 
evangelicalism. America waged the wars against Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and against 
Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, yet U.S. relations with China improved smoothly during the 
Bush administration. Progress was made in bilateral economic, trade, counterterrorism, 
military and law enforcement exchanges and cooperation. It is clear that the Bush 
administration has “placed a priority on positive, productive Sino-American relations at the 
expense of its commitment to international human rights”, (124) though from the Chinese 
perspective “the United States continued to use issues concerning human rights, religion, the 
Dalai Lama and Hong Kong to interfere in China’s internal affairs.” (125)  
 President Barack Obama visited China from November 15 to 18, 2009. This trip set a 
constructive tone for the future. President Obama claimed in his speech that he welcomed the 
emergence of China as a new force in the global economy and rebuffed suggestions that 
China’s rise should be seen as a sign of American decline. China has been building reserves and 
now has in excess of $2.2 trillion, which shows that China is rapidly becoming an economic 
superpower, while America has been accumulating debt and owes about $800 billion to China. 
(126)   
During his stay in China, Obama proclaimed the importance of more open and freer 
communication and the universal value of freedom and human rights, yet he did not put too 
much pressure on China. Obama has tried to avoid blunt confrontation in favor of something 
more cooperative. He has sought to focus on common ground and shared interests, hoping for 
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clearing away “old preconceptions or ideological dogmas” so that the nations will be more 
likely “to cooperate than not cooperate”. Despite of his objection to Chinese Internet 
censorship, he recognized that “different countries have different traditions.” (127)  
 
Table 3. 
Projections of GDP, 2005-30       Projections of Defense, 2003-30 
At PPP in U.S. Dollars (trillions)          in U.S.Dollars (billions) 
 __________________________     ___________________________ 
           China  U.S.  OECD                   China  U.S.  OECD 
  2005    9     12     34              2003     60   417    740 
 2010   14     17     44              2010     88   482    843 
 2015   21     22     55              2015     121  554    962 
2020   30     28     73              2020     152  628    1089 
 2025   44     37     88              2025     190  711    1233 
2030   63     49     105             2030     238  808    1398       
                            (Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2008, p36-37) 
 
The emergence of China will shape the world much as that of the U.S. did in the late 19th 
century. What remains to be seen is whether the rise of China will complement the U.S. or 
undermine it; whether the future will bring a new, cooperative and mutually beneficial 
economic order or a predictable replay of one great power giving way to the next. As America 
being the world’s greatest power and China being the world’s greatest emerging power, the 
relationship between these two countries will largely determine the history of the twenty-first 
century. History teaches that such power transitions are inherently fraught with dangers and 
opportunities that best managed with grand visions. Thus, it would serve the interests of both 
the United States and China to rethink their relationship in the future, to “set aside the 
self-limiting and outmoded notions of an earlier era in favor of a mature pragmatism,” (128) 
which is appropriate to the two nations’ transformed status as global powers.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
  The issue of war has occurred and been referred to frequently during past U.S.-China 
relations. The Opium war resulted in the first governmental treaty and diplomatic relations 
between America and China in 1844. During the Chinese Taiping Rebellion and civil war from 
the 1850s to the 1860s, America decided to support the Manchu government because of 
considerations of trade and political-economic interests. The American Civil War from 1861 to 
1865 forced America to cooperate more willingly with the powers in dealing with China affairs. 
After the 1895 Chinese defeat in the war with Japan, America turned its emphasis on Japan 
more than on China. The American victory over Spain in 1898 made America a great power 
and made possible the “Open Door” policy in China. Theodore Roosevelt rejoiced over Japan’s 
assault on Russian hegemony in China’s Manchuria region because he believed there would be 
no damage to American interests after a Japanese victory. After World War I, China was on the 
winners’ side and pinned its hope on national self-determination. Nevertheless, Wilson still 
sacrificed Chinese territory and interests to Japan. In the 1930s Japanese invasions in China, 
Franklin Roosevelt preferred the neutrality policy, and in the 1945 Yalta conference, America 
sacrificed China’s Outer Mongolia and Manchuria to gain Stalin’s military help in the Far East. 
Until 1949, America was more or less involved in China’s civil war and had to see a 
communists’ victory in China. The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 made China and America 
enemies. The Vietnam War became a long time nightmare for America due to China’s 
consistent support and supply to North Vietnam. The border conflict and the danger of war 
between China and the Soviet Union pushed Nixon and Kissinger to change their foreign 
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policy towards China. In the 1999 Balkan war, American missiles bombarded the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade, an event which China considered a deliberate act of war. American war 
in Afghanistan in 2001 and war in Iraq in 2003 made China’s help and cooperation more 
important.         
Power and the use of power are also very obvious in U.S.-China relations. From the 
initial contact of the two countries, China first acted as a big power and dominated relations 
with America and other nations. Yet Chinese power was humbled because of defeats by British 
power and then by French power. America enjoyed limited power in the 1840s and then had to 
follow “jackal diplomacy” and more cooperation with the major powers in dealing with China. 
Since then American government could assume that “the superior firepower would be able to 
validate the just cause of Western civilization.” (129)When America became a major power, it 
began to initiate its own policy towards China and in the East Asian region. Among major 
powers in the beginning of the twentieth century, Japan was more powerful and more 
influential in China due to its geographical position. During World War II, America had to deal 
with Japanese power, and then very soon after the war, America faced the growing power of the 
Soviet Union and the rise of Chinese power. Given “the U.S. position in the global system, its 
structural power, allowed Washington to keep Beijing relatively isolated” until the 1970s. 
(130)Recently, with the burgeoning Chinese economy, American superpower has been and will 
continue to be challenged by China, the greatest emerging power. 
Naturally the concepts of power and balance of power are closely related. During the 
early period of U.S.-China relations, America balanced between the established power of the 
Chinese Empire and the British Empire. After the Opium War, the balance obviously moved 
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favorably towards British power. When America became major power, it began to balance 
competing major powers in China with the “Open Door” policy in order to achieve the 
maximum benefits for America. Theodore Roosevelt rejoiced when Japan acted as a counter 
force to the Russian hegemony in China’s Manchuria. Meanwhile at the same time, he also 
hoped that Russia would serve as a check and balance to Japanese power. William Taft believed 
that the political goal of the United States in East Asia was a stable balance of power resting on 
a sovereign China and secured by “dollar diplomacy.” Japanese dominance in China in the 
1930s destabilized the balance of power and severely damaged American interests, and the 
Soviet alliance with China in the 1950s completely demolished American influence in China. 
In the 1970s, America and China improved relations and exploited in the balance of power 
against the Soviet Union, and in the 1990s China and Russia worked together to counter 
balance American unilateral and superpower status. Today America works closely with Japan 
and India to balance the power of China, and America’s policy of maintaining the status quo of 
Taiwan is obviously serves as checking the rising strength and influence of mainland China.   
“Sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.” (131)  
Every country is endowed with unalienable rights of sovereignty, equality and security. Due 
to different geographical positions and different history, the sensitivity of the sovereignty 
issue means differently to America and to China. Since the independence, most Americans 
concerned very little about their national existence, for the two vast oceans protected much of 
their borders, the two neighbors were more or less friendly and far weaker, and the big powers 
were far away in Europe. Yet for China, since the Nanjing Treaty with Britain in 1842 until the 
Japanese surrender in 1945, China’s national sovereignty and security suffered severely. 
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China experienced perils and humiliations of military occupation, territorial concession and 
even partition by the powers during her century of decline. American involvements in the 
Korean War and in the Vietnam War were regarded by Chinese leaders as proof of animosity 
and threat to the region and to China’s own security. The Taiwan status issue concerns China’s 
core interests of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, while for America it is only of 
peripheral interest and a way to check China. The Taiwan Strait dispute remains one of the 
world’s dangerous flash points, and America should take care not to “play with fire”. (132) As 
to the current issues of Tibet and the Dalai Lama, Xinjiang and the secessionists, China will 
not concede her ultimate rights of territory and interests even when faced with pressures and 
challenges from America. In the end “no matter what happens in China, American policy 
toward that country should be guided by a clear and firm sense of American national interests” 
(133), without indulging in any dispute in China’s territory issue.  
In the early period of U.S. relations with China from 1784 to 1844, China occupied a 
position of dominance through her great military power and unparalleled economic leverage. 
In the 1820s, China shared 30% of the world’s GDP. Since China’s defeat by Britain in the 
1840s, British power of military dominance was prevalent in China’s foreign relations. 
America followed the “Jackal diplomacy” due to her own limited power and influence. Only 
after the War with Spain, did America become a global power and adopt imperialist policies, 
with military occupation of Cuba and the Philippines. The “Open Door” policy of John Hay 
witnessed the rising American dominance in U.S.-China relations. At the same time, Russia 
and Japan vied and fought in China’s Manchuria in 1904 for territorial control. In the 1930s and 
in the 1940s, Japanese militarists were eager to take over all of China as its colony, which was 
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one reason for the showdown between Japan and America in the Far East during World War II. 
From 1946 to 1949, the transient hegemony America enjoyed in China was lost when the 
Nationalist government was defeated by the communists in the civil war. The subsequent 
Soviet dominance in China was soon replaced by the Chinese Soviet rifts and conflicts, 
followed by U.S.-China rapprochement and cooperation against Soviet global hegemony. 
Whether in the system of Cold War bipolarity or the unilateral power system after the Soviet 
collapse, America occupied and still occupies the dominant and offensive position due to its 
overwhelming and unrivalled economic and political power.         
After the independence from Britain with the help from her French alliance, America 
abided by George Washington’s advice of noninvolvement in the old continent’s affairs as 
noted in his Farewell Address to avoid “the insidious wiles of foreign influence” and to “steer 
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world.” (134) During the Civil War 
in the 1860s, America more willingly cooperated with the big powers to deal with the issues 
related to China. At the beginning of the 1900s, America refused the Japanese proposal for the 
alliance against Russia. During World War II, China allied with America to fight Japan, yet 
soon after the war, the two countries became enemies, and the former enemies of America and 
Japan allied against China and Russia. The Sino-Soviet alliance gradually came to an end, and 
in the 1970s it was replaced by the quasi-military cooperation and alliance between China and 
America to counter the Soviet global expansion. Today, U.S.-China relations are positioned as 
a strategic dialogue and partnership, and America fears a possible re-alliance between China 
and Russia against America’s unilateral superpower status.  
The four liberal concepts of “equality”, “rationality”, “liberty” and “property” are hard 
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to apply to the past U.S.-China relations. From 1784 to 1844, China, the Middle Kingdom, was 
a big empire with great economic and military power and tribute system. Chinese at that time 
regarded all other nations and countries including America as barbaric and inferior, which had 
to pay homage to the Chinese emperor. America had recently achieved independence and 
freedom from the British tyrant George III, and held it to be self-evident “that all men are 
created equal,” and “harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, 
humanity and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial 
hand.” (135)In the absence of governmental treaties between the two countries, the American 
merchants in China had to obey the tyrannical Chinese authorities and were at the mercy of the 
Chinese emperor. For the next century from 1844 to 1945, China was afflicted by defeat and 
humiliation from the big powers, including America. China was deprived of sovereignty, 
forced to open ports, with foreign controlled customs tariffs, extra-territorial jurisdiction, 
spheres of influences and foreign military occupation. In fact, no equality existed between 
China and the big powers, much less the principles of rationality, liberty and sanctity of 
property.  
As to commercial liberalism, democratic liberalism, and regulatory liberalism, we see 
that international economic expansion does not necessarily prevents wars. On the contrary, it 
caused the outbreak of World War I among the imperial big powers. Certainly, domestic public 
opinion does not always prevent the use of force, because the public may be manipulated by the 
media. International laws and organizations seem to play more important roles in the world 
affairs, nevertheless, the League of Nations lacked the power to protect China and Ethiopia 
from the invasion of Japan and Italy, and it surely could not avoid the coming of World War II. 
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The Korean War actually was between China and the United Nation’s sixteen-nation-armies 
led by America. The international organizations’ authority and power is relative and 
comparative. It is stronger when it challenges the weaker and smaller nations, yet it becomes 
weaker when it faces challenges from the stronger and bigger powers. Michael Hunt argues 
that moralism and legalism are “errant and inappropriate to international affairs”, (136) for 
moralism is devoted to virtue yet without power, and legalism is suited to domestic and not to 
world politics. On the contrary, if moralism is strengthened with power and force, there can 
also be problems. Hans Morgenthau believed that “moral crusaders and ideological 
self-righteousness constitute the most important threat to international relations: what is good 
for the crusading country is by definition good for all mankind, and if the rest of mankind 
refuses to accept such claims to universal recognition, it must be converted with fire and sword.” 
(137) 
During the long history of U.S.-China relations, several cases were related to liberalism. 
The Chinese Taiping Rebellion was characterized by indigenous Christian beliefs, yet this 
similarity of ideology with the West didn’t guarantee that the big powers including America 
would support the rebellion against the moribund tyranny, because of the more important 
considerations of trade and national interests. The anti-Chinese-immigrant violence in the 
1870s and the exclusion of Chinese immigration in 1904 revealed the discrepancy between the 
American ideal of equality and the reality of racial discrimination. Wilson’s idealism of 
“self-determination” was shattered in relations with China by his compromise to the greed of 
Japan. President Franklin Roosevelt’s sympathy to China was tarnished by his sacrifice of 
Outer Mongolia and Manchuria to the Soviets. The phobia against communism postponed 
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America’s recognition of China’s new government in Beijing, and radical McCarthyism drew 
America into one of the most shameful and destructive episodes in its history. John Dulles’ 
intransigent anti-communism and Domino theory impeded the improvement of U.S.-China 
relations. Presidents John Kennedy and Johnson neglected the rifts and disputes between the 
two biggest communist countries and missed the early chance of reconciliation with China. 
The antagonism of the ideology between China and America in the 1970s did not prevent the 
two countries from cooperating against Moscow, which shared the same ideology with China. 
The human rights issue took center stage in relations between China and America after the 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, yet China’s most-favored-nation status was never 
suspended. And especially for the recent years, America often has been outmaneuvered by 
China in the U.N. Human Rights Commission due to America’s Iraq War and the abuse of 
prisoners by American personnel. Even today the American government and experts are still 
discussing whether the United States is “justified in making human rights in other countries a 
legitimate issue and, if so, how to effectively promote those rights without sacrificing other 
goals.” (138) 
Constructivism focuses on the anarchical nature of the international system and how a 
nation identifies itself and its interests. From the first contact until today, the word of “interest” 
has been possibly the most frequently used word in American foreign policy toward China. It is 
agreed that interests and power are the ultimate goal for a state, yet different persons, groups, 
parties, and policy-makers may conceive interests differently. “The goals and interests that 
affect players’ desired outcomes include national security interests, organizational interests, 
domestic interests, and personal interests.” (139)  
101 
 Like all relations between states, U.S. relations with China are fundamentally based on 
interests. As the global leader, America occupies dominant positions in the United Nations, the 
World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other global 
institutions. American national power is still unparalleled and the political system and ideology 
are different from that of China. America still takes the offensive role and projects more 
powerful influences on China. “The process of China’s emergence as a great power is 
underway, but this achievement needs not lead to conflict.” (140) Many Chinese view America 
as a major threat to their nation’s security and domestic stability, for America is the only 
country that has the power and might to curtail or destabilize China. Yet, today the U.S.-China 
relationship is not that of confrontation and rivalry for primacy as in the Cold War, it is a 
relationship of competition and cooperation on many issues.  
Despite the ups and downs in U.S.-China relations over the past years, Beijing has 
persisted in the belief that there are more opportunities than challenges for China today. China 
can transcend ideological differences for peace, development, and cooperation, rather than vye 
for global domination. In recent years, “China has begun to take a less confrontational, more 
sophisticated, more confident, and at times, more constructive approach toward regional and 
global affairs.” (141) The U.S.-China relationship will mainly depend on how the two countries 
define their interests. Washington and Beijing must pragmatically seek out opportunities for 
action where realism and both sides’ interests can intersect. 
China is a country with a long history and great influence, not just a relic of the 
communist era. America is a country with a liberal culture and pragmatic policies, not a final 
arbitrator of universal values. By necessity, U.S. relations with China generally have more 
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interests in common than common values. In the past, America and China shared the common 
anti-Japanese sentiment in World War II and the same European enemy--the Soviet Union-- 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. Even today, anti-terrorism is one of the common grounds for 
the cooperation of the U.S. and China. America has been a democratic country with checks and 
balances since her independence, yet China has an authoritarian and totalitarian tradition dating 
back to ancient times. These two nations seldom share common values. During the past years, 
whenever the two countries focused on trade, business and common interests, U.S.-China 
relations progressed smoothly; whenever ideology, value and human rights overrode these 
interests, America and China were always entangled in antagonism and animosity. American 
racism and anti-Chinese immigration laws in the 1870s, the rise of communism in China, 
McCarthyism in the 1950s, the Tiananmen Square crisis and human rights issues in 1989 are 
examples of ideological disputes leading to conflicts between the two countries. From the 
history of U.S.-China relations, we see clearly power and interest have dominated during their 
two hundred and twenty five year history, while differences in beliefs only affected relations 
transiently and negatively. Precisely at this time when U.S.-China relations are full of 
unprecedented hope, U.S. policymakers should conclude that “the old dichotomy between 
realism and idealism has never really applied to the United States,” (142) and universal ideals 
shouldn’t be at odds with the top priority--American power and American national interest. 
Even the Chinese government believes “China-U.S. relations have growing global significance. 
To maintain healthy and stable growth of U.S. relations with China in a changing international 
environment is fundamental to the interests of both China and America, and is conducive to 
upholding and promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.” (143)  
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The U.S. policy towards China represents a mixed historical record, with extreme shifts     
ranging from business only, “semi-colonial repression, benign neglect, active hostility, barely 
concealed animosity,” (144) finally to secret partnerships and strategic competition. 
Inconsistency in policies became apparent after World War II, but what has been consistent is 
the self-centered American interests and American power. It is obvious that the relations 
between the two countries are sometimes “like images and perceptions that the two peoples 
have of each other, and have swung between two extremes: friends or enemies, love or hate.” 
(145) The American foreign policy-makers should try to avoid the temptation of either coddling 
or demonizing China, the world’s next superpower. Instead the U.S. should stick to the motto 
by Palmerston: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are 
eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” (146)  
 The History of U.S. relations with China has demonstrated crucial testimony and 
verification for the interpretation of classical realism that emphasizes national interest and 
national power. Even today in America, different interest groups, parties and policy-makers 
might still perceive different strategies and policies towards China. Whether offensive or 
defensive, short-term or long-term, business as a top priority or human rights as the banner 
issue, the point that should always be kept in mind is how American interests and power are 
identified, affected and preserved. The American government needs to understand how China 
will conceive, calculate and respond in current and future relations, based on their respective 
interests and power status.    
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